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In recent years Turkey has exhibited a definite shift in
her foreign policy away from her previously narrow Western
orientation toward a new multilateral and more independent
stance. Events surrounding and foreign reaction to the Cyprus
crises of 1964 and 1974 stand out as being instrumental in
initiating Turkey's search for a more balanced foreign policy.
However, there were and are other very potent factors affecting
this new orientation. This study represents an analysis of the
determinants of Turkish foreign policy, especially since World
War II. Changes and trends in Turkey's political, social and
economic life which impacted upon her foreign policy are examined
within the context of changes within the international system.
After identifying the determinants of Turkey's foreign policies,
both past and present, various options for new directions in her
foreign policy are examined. Finally, a forecast for the furure
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I. INTRODUCTION
He who does not heed proverbs will ,
not avoid mistakes.- Turkish Proverb
His mother an onion, his father garlic,
himself comes out conserve of rose.-
Turkish Proverb
The transformation of Turkey from the traditional Islamic
Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-state, the Republic of
Turkey, stands out as one of the most impressive developments
of the Twentieth century. Although the transformation appeared
to be a reduction of Turkey from a major power to a small nation
status, it was only an outward illusion since, as George
Lenczowski points out, "in reality the old Empire had been weak
and disintegrating while the reborn Turkey of Kemal [Ataturk]
proved to be a relatively strong, closely knit, and homogeneous
2political organism."
The Turkish Republic which emerged from the ashes of World
War I under the skillful leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
the founder of the Republic and the father of modern Turkey,
was destined to play an important role in global politics .
Historically, Turkey is located on one of, if not the most,
strategic and traditionally most coveted pieces of territory
3
on the globe. She not only controls the Turkish Straits
which link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, but also the
historic invasion routes from the 3alkans and the Caucasus
Mountains onto the high Anatolian plateau, which in turn com-
mands the entire Fertile Crescent down to the oil rich Persian

Gulf and the Red Sea. Therefore, Turkey, with borders on
Europe, the Middle East and the Soviet Union possesses a role
in world politics far greater than her size, population and
economic strength would indicate.
The geostra.tegic importance of Turkey for the major actors
in the international system has varied in relation to tech-
nological advancements, the intensity of their rivalry and
the focal point or geographic location of their conflicts .
Also, as one might expect based upon power politics neither
the United States nor the Soviet Union -- the dominant world
powers since World War II -- have apparently not felt any moral
or legal obligation to place Turkey's needs above their own
national interests. It was assumed that a foreign policy that
protected their own interests would at the same time serve and
protect Turkish interests
.
While it is obvious that Turkish foreign policy after 194 7
was a by-produce and an extension of American policy towards
the Soviet Union, and consequently towards the Middle East and
the Third World countries as well, one should not simply dismiss
Turkey as a pawn of the West during the Cold War period. To do
so would be to give no credit to the Turkish statesmen and to
completely disregard Turkey's dire needs during that period.
Turkish-American relations following World War II were solidly
based on mutual interests and common aspirations . Their alliance
was based primarily on the American postwar policy of "contain-
ment" and Turkey's requirement for both military and economic

assistance. George Harris describes the Turkish-American
alliance as one within which "disagreements that did crop up
were dwarfed by the impressive coincidence of interests of the
parties and their commitment to each other."
In the early 1960s it would have been difficult to imagine
that, within a few short years, deep anti-American sentiments
would emerge in Turkey. It would have been even harder to
imagine a Turkish rapprochement with the Soviets. Nevertheless,
the mid-1960s witnessed a steady rise in Turkish disillusionment
with the West, increasing anti-Americanism and a concomitant
foreign policy reorientation, including an improvement in
Turkish-Soviet relations.
The 1970s have witnessed a dramatic reappraisal of Turkish
foreign policy. Rapprochement with the Soviet Union led to the
signing of an important political document in 1979, calling for
increased friendship and greater economic cooperation between
these two former archenemies."
Of the various factors instrumental in bringing about the
present orientation in Turkish foreign policy, the Cyprus dis-
pute stands out. However, to attribute the changes in Turkey
solely to the events surrounding the Cyprus question would be
ludicrous and constitute a very shallow observation. An exam-
ination of the political dynamics of Turkish foreign policy
will reveal that there were very potent factors other than
Cyprus involved in Turkey's transition -- factors such as detente,
the energy crisis, and political and social changes in Turkey.

In fact, the number and potency of these other variables were
such that Turkish foreign policy was destined for change with
or without the Cyprus dispute . A case in point is Soviet-Turkish
rapprochement which began prior to the first significant dispute
on Cyprus. Of course, the events surrounding Cyprus undoubtedly
hastened and intensified change in Turkish policies. Therefore,
in this respect, Cyprus can most certainly be considered the
catalyst for change in Turkish foreign policy.
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the
various factors that contributed to Turkey's shift from a strict
Western oriented foreign policy toward a more independent and
multilateral policy. Although the focus of this study will be
on Turkey's deteriorating Western relations, especially her
American relations, it will necessarily touch upon the variables
leading to Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and
better relations with the Middle Eastern and other Third World
countries .
Foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which in-
volve relations of states with each other. Any given foreign
policy act or decision reflects the idiosyncracies of the
. . 7decision maker and result from a complex synthesis of three
broad categories of considerations. First is domestic poli-
tics within the foreign policy decision maker's state. Second
is the economic and military capability of his state. And
third is the international context, that is, the particular
position in which the decision maker's state finds itself
13

specifically in relation to other states in the system. Each
in turn affects the other through inherent linkages that
produce dynamic and continuous changes in the political, econ-
omic and social life of the state
.
Domestic or foreign political events and decisions cannot
be separated from past experiences and historical backgrounds .
The past experiences and historical background along with
geopolitical imperatives place certain constraints on a state's
decision makers. To understand the policies of any country,
it is essential to know and understand these factors. There-
fore, while the main interest of this study is the political
dynamics of Turkish foreign policy after World War II, Chapter
II deals with the issues and determinants of Turkish foreign
policy between 1918 and 1945. To provide a brief analysis of
the historical background to Turkey's post World War II policies,
the political events and their determinants are examined in three
subgroups: 1913-1923, 1923-1938, and 1938-1954. In this and
the following chapters an effort is made to show the linkage
between the domestic and foreign policy, and the impact of in-
ternations factors on both.
Chapter III deals with the period immediately following
World War II up to but not including the 1960 military coup.
Chapter IV covers the period from the 1960 coup up to 1969.
Attention is given in this chapter to the basic political
changes which followed the coup.
Chapter V analyzes the events of the 1970s to date.
11

In each of these three chapters (III, IV, V), following
an analysis of the domestic and international factors influ-
encing Turkish foreign policy during that particular period,
a look is taken at specific Turkish foreign policy interaction
with the two major actors in the system, the United States and
the Soviet Union. Turkey's relations with the Arabs and other
Third World countries are also examined.
A historical-analytical approach was used to identify the
roots of Turkey's current foreign policy. Since this study is
a foreign policy analysis, not a foreign policy history, no
attempt was made to document in this work all of Turkey's
foreign relations with the specific nations cover. Rather,
specific events and decisions received attention only if they
illustrated a trend or a reaction to a particular event of
interest, or if they in themselves produce a significant reac-
tion in Turkey's foreign policy.
Chapter VI attempts to provide a comprehensive summary of
those factors which have affected Turkish policy in the past,
as well as those that are determinants of Turkey's present
policy. By examining the various forces which are active today
and projecting those which may be significant in the future,
various options for new orientations in Turkish foreign policy
are examined. Finally a forecast for the future of Turkey's
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2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. , 1950)
, pp. 477-
483.
2 ...George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs
,
3rd
ed. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 123.
3Napoleon is said to have placed such importance on the
Turkish Straits that he declared his willingness "to abandon
mastery over half the world rather than yield Russia those
narrow straits." See Ferenc A. Vali
,
The Turkish Straits and
NATO (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. ix
.
4.
Obviously Turkey's strategic geographic location was impor-
tant in respect to the American "containment" policy. When the
focal point of US-Soviet confrontation shifted to Korea, then
to Cuba and then to Southeast Asia, the relative importance of
Turkey's position decreased. However, with the current focus
on Soviet involvement in Africa, the volitivity of the Arab-
Israeli dispute, and the increased importance of Arab oil,
Turkey's geostrategic position once again demands attention.
George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American
Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971 (Washington and





For a detailed account of Turkish-American relations
between 194-5 and 1971, see Harris, Troubled Alliance .
7 .
This study does not deal specifically with individual
Turkish leaders and their idiosyncrasies. However, an excellent
study dealing with this variable is available. See Metin Tamkoc,,




II. ISSUES AND DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
BETWEEN THE WARS: 1918-1945
Call the bear uncle until you have crossed
the bridge . - Turkish Proverb
He who loves the rose resigns himself to
suffering from the thorns . - Turkish Proverb
A grand chapter in Turkish history ended with the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I . The Treaty
of Lausanne which was finally signed on 24 July 1923 re-
established complete and undivided Turkish sovereignty in
almost all the territory included in the present day Turkish
Republic, and the Capitulations -- so strongly resented by
Turks as a symbol of inferiority and subservience -- were
abolished. Although it contained restrictions on the straits,
the Treaty of Lausanne was essentially international recogni-
tion of the demands expressed in the Turkish National Pact.
Thus, asserts Bernard Lewis, "Turkey, alone among The defeated
powers of the First World War, succeeded in rising from her
own ruins and, rejecting the dictated peace imposed on her by
the victors, secured the acceptance of her own terms." A
new era had begun.
Today, the Turkish nation carries the deep impressions of
historical experiences of being reduced from a vast empire to
relative nothingness, and then having to struggle back to save
the national homeland and independence. The struggle for
survival and the play of realpolitik in the international
14

arena left strong imprints on the national philosophy of
Turkey and the character of its people.
Historical experiences cannot be separated from the present
day life of a nation. Like individuals, nations react to both
internal and external forces within the international political
arena based on their historical impressions, prejudices and
national image of themselves and other nations. Good or bad,
right or wrong, historical experiences color a nation's reaction
to events and forces in the political system. For this reason,
although the focal point of this study is Turkish foreign policy
since World War II, issues and determinants of Turkey's foreign
policy from World War I through World War II will be examined.
The Turkish Republic that rose from the ashes of the First
World War bore little resemblance to its forerunner, the Otto-
man Empire. The new Turkey was not a empire, but a relatively
small nation-state; not an autocracy or theocracy, but a demo-
cracy and a parlimentary system; not a state founded on expan-
sionist principles , but a nation dedicated to peaceful co-
existance; not a multi-national, multi-racial, and multi-
religious state
,
but a homogeneous and united people . Ker
aims were not to create and expand an empire, but to build and
perpetuate a strong stable nation within the boundaries of her
homeland. Yet, in this new endeavor there were numerous ob-
stacles to be overcome. In addition to the radical and revo-
lutionary changes that Ataturk began to introduce, Turkey
15

had to try to adjust her political position in the interna-
tional arena under the impact of systemic and subsystemic forces
The period of Turkish history under consideration in this
chapter can best be examined in three time-periods, since
different forces both external and internal were active
during each period.
The first period, 1918-23, was the time of the Turkish War
for Independence.
The second period, 1923-1938 was the era of Mustafa Kemai
Ataturk . It was an era of building, reconstruction, social
revolution and reforms at every level of social, economic and
political activity. It was the time of a race for modernization
-- a race in which Turkey had a late start of at least a hundred
years
.
The years of 1939-45 belonged to Inonu ana the Republican
Peoples' Party. It was the time of the Second World War and
the beginning of the Cold War alignments in the international
system.
A. THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC: 1918-1923
The settlements imposed by the Allies following World War I
were harsh and vindictive". The terms of the Treaty of Sevres
which was signed by Sultan Vahideddin's representatives on
10 August 19 20 would have left Turkey helpless and a mere
shadow state existing on the whims of the powers and peoples
2
who were annexing her richest lands.
15

The treaty was not, however, implemented. Ataturk was
able to unite the various elements of resistance which had
formed in Turkey and lead them to success. The thoughts and
motivations of the majority of the Turkish people were ex-
pressed in the opening phrases of Ataturk' s call for a nation-
alist movement:
The unity of the Fatherland and
national independence are in danger.
The Istanbul government is unable
to carry out its responsibilities
.
It is only through the nation's
efforts and determination that national
independence will be won.
It is necessary to establish a
national committee , free from all ex-
ternal influences and control, that
will review the national situation
and make known to the world the people's
desire for justice.
This message, issued in June 1919 and known as the Amasya
Protocol, was to become the key note of the nationalist pro-
3gram during the next few years
.
During this period of time, 1918-1923, it is easy to see
that Turkish foreign policy was based on a desperate will to
survive as a nation and a viable political entity, and to
maintain the independence of the Turkish people . The struggle
for independence took place in the aftermath of a military
defeat and the collapse of an extensive political system.
The long and bitter struggle that ensued during and after
World War I left the Turk cynical and distrustful of most
17

foreign powers and peoples -- in a state of near xenophobia.
Although the war had left the Turk bitter and cynical, he
did not become either pessimistic or desperate about his
future. If anything, external pressure and internal struggle
awoke in the Turkish people the long dormant spirit of self-
reliance and perseverance -- the characteristics that had
made the Ottomans the rulers of one of the greatest empires
in history. This spirit and feeling were later expressed
by Atatilrk when he exclaimed, "Happy is the man who calls
himself a Turk." 5
Not withstanding the overwhelming domestic and foreign
policy problems , the Turks under Ataturk were able to expell
the foreign powers -- some by force and others through nego-
tiations -- from the Turkish homeland. They were now ready
to undertake the radical social and political reforms that
were to lay the foundation of a Western oriented, republican
system of government in Turkey.
B. THE ATATURK ERA: 19 2 3-13 3 8
The breakup following World War I of the Ottoman, the
Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires -- empires that had
played significant if not crucial roles in the international
political and economic system -- signaled change for rhe system,
The disintegration of these three great empires increased the
number and changed the quality of the actors in the interna-
tional system. Most of the new actors were politically un-
stable and economically weak compared to the victorious powers

of World War I. World politics and economics were still pri-
marily determined by the relations among European nations
,
just as had been the case prior to the war. Asia and Africa
were the imperial prizes for which the great powers of Europe
contended. The major change during this period between the
two World Wars was that the locus of important actors was
expanded to include the United States and Japan. And, for
its part, the United States was content to be a spectator to
the European struggle for empires
.
The political indicators of this period in which the new
Turkish nation found itself were colonialism, industrialistic-
capitalist growth and its counter part, communism. Victors
and vanquished alike were engaged in reconstruction of their
economies
.
Within the political realities of this international
system Ataturk began the laborious task of reconstruction
and modernization of Turkey. To Ataturk this modernization
equated to Westernization. Modernization in terms of the
West was not a novel thought in Turkish nistory. After a
series of Ottoman defeats at the hands of Western powers,
Selim III (1789-1307) began a program of "defensive modern-
ization," which due to various factors, including the pre-
servation of the traditional elements of social and spiritual
culture, enjoyed only limited success up to the time of
Ataturk. Most Ottoman and Turkish modernizers did agree
upon one basic assumption, and that was, as so well stated
19

by Abdullah Ceudet (1869-1932), co-founder of the Society of
Union and Progress and most farsighted of the Young Turk
political writers: "There is no second civilization: civil-
ization means European civilization, and it must be imported
7
with both its roses and thorns." Ataturk believed in Euro-
pean civilization and was willing to accept "both its roses
and its thorns."
In order to carry out the radical reforms necessary to
breakdown the traditional social and spiritual culture of
Turkey and transform it into a secular and Western culture,
Ataturk needed a strong political power base as a source of
g
authority. Fortunately, 19th century experiments with
Western education had produced an educated official class
which Ataturk used to form the nucleus of Turkey's modernizing
9
elites -- the Republican Peoples' Party. This elite
group of administrators, under Ataturk s' guidance and within
the framework of a one-party authoritarian regime, imposed
revolutionary changes from the top. This pattern of elite,
one-party politics was to set the trend in Turkish politics
many years to come
.
During the period of Ataturk Turkish policies were based
on a set of principles popularly known as the "Six Arrows."
These principles were:
Republicanism was directed against the re-estab-
lishment of the sultanate and caliphate . It
recognized the republican form of government as




Nationalism was based on common citizenship and





Populism repudiated class privileges and provided
equally in law.
Etatism stood for a constructive and productive inter-
vention by the state in the national economy.
Secularism separated religion from the state.
Revolutionism (Reformism) provided the state with




Ataturk ' s social and cultural revolution was successful
for numerous reasons , a few of which warrant mentioning in
the context of this study. First, the years of relative calm
and disengagement from armed conflict in the inter-national
arena provided the time needed for Turkey's transformation.
Second, the establishment of a clear distinction between the
army and the government "not only facilixated the transition
from empire to republic, it also enabled Turkey in the 1920s
13
to overcome the affliction of militarism." Finally, timing
of his major reform programs greatly increased Ataturk'
s
chances for success. Between 1919 and 1923 Ataturk success-
fully defended Turkish sovereignty and replaced the old imperial
consciousness with a fierce nationalism. Then, in 1924, after
erecting the institutions of his new state and consolidating
his power he proceeded with his reforms
.
Although the keynote of Turkey's internal policies, espe-
cially during the two decades following World War I, was
21

"change", her foreign policy was that of a status quo power.
With the exception of Iskenderun (Alexandretta) , which Turkey
regained from Syria in 1939, and Mosul, which it ceded to Iraq
in 1926, the present borders of Turkey are those outlined in
the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. This indeed reflected a departure
from the militant expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire.
Foreign relations of Atattlrk ' s Turkey were dominated by concerns
for genuine independence and sovereignty. It was colored by
historical memories of foreign intervention, economic dependency
and a lack of jurisdiction over aliens or foreign-protected
14
citizens. Just as it gave Ataturk the time needed for in-
ternal reforms, the peaceful international period following
the Turkish War of Independence greatly helped the implementa-
tion of Turkey's independent foreign policy.
"Peace at home, peace in the world" was the slogan which
gave direction to Ataturk' s foreign policy. Edward Weisband
concludes that of all the "great socio-political revolutions
in the history of the modern state . . . the Kemalist Revolution
in Turkey represents the only one that has produced an ideology
1 r
of peace." During Ataturk 's time, the two dominant axioms
of Turkish foreign policy were:
1) The priority of peace, sovereignty
and national development over ex-
pansionist-revisionism, and;
2) The belief that the Soviet Union
represented the primary threat to ,
_
the security of Turkey.
22

In light of the first principle of "peace, sovereignty
and national development," it was a cautious and realistic
assessment of the nation's conditions that led Ataturk to
suggest strongly a policy of external non-involvement and
internal development . His advisors urged Ataturk to enter
an alliance with one of the great European powers , but he
chose to pursue a neutralist policy and began establishing
1 8
and emphasizing security and peace with all Turkey's neighbors.
Despite traditional animosities , a Greek-Turkish treaty
was concluded in 19 30. This was followed in 19 34 by the
Balkan Entente Pact which united Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania
and Turkey in a mutual guarantee of peace, independence, and
territorial integrity. The pact was in large part a reaction
to Italy's revisionism. A noteworthy provision of the Balkan
Pact was the one which exempted Turkey from any obligation
to the pact if it involved hostilities with the Soviet Union.
Ideally, Bulgaria should have been included in the Balkan Pact,
but, probably based on her resentment of the Neuilly Treaty
of 19 2 which broke up Bulgaria and transferred some of her
lands to Greece and Yugoslavia, she refused membership. In
19 37, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan concluded the Saadabad
19pact, which established an Eastern Entente.
Revisionist actions by Italy and Germany during the 19 30s
forced Turkey's involvement in the international system
beyond mere regional concerns. It was through her efforts
in the League of Nations, which she had joined in 19 32, that
23

Turkey was successful in changing some of the clauses of the
Lausanne Treaty which pertained to the Turkish Straits . The
Montreux Convention of 1936 restored the control of the Straits
to the Turkish government , and gave Turkey the right to re-
militarize them. Turkey was supported in this action by the
Soviet Union who endeavored to reduce the freedom of the non-
riparian states to enter the Black Sea. Because of the rising
German danger to European peace, and not wanting to antagonize
the Soviet Union, both Great Britain and France went along with
the new provisions. The Montreux Convention is still (1973)
in effect.
The second principle of Turkish foreign policy ideology,
namely, that "the Soviet Union represented the primary threat
to Turkey's security, " had its roots deeply embedded in history
Since the 17th century, Russia's expansionist policies had
helped it to become the "archenemy" of the Ottomans . A suc-
cession of major defeats at Russian hands had consistently
confronted the Sublime Porte with the relaities of its declin-
ing power. Moreover, it was Tzar Nicholas I who described
Turkey as the "sick man of Europe" when he proposed to the
British in 1344- that the Ottoman Empire be partitioned. The
final of thirteen Russo-Turkish wars was of course the First
World War. It was Ataturk himself, commanding the Sixteenth
21
army, who succeeded in stopping the Russian forces.
Thus, it is one of the ironies of history that the Russian
Government was the first to recognize Ataturk's regime as the
24

legitimate government of the new Turkey. Actually, the reasons
for the "friendly" relations between Turkey and Russia during
this early period are quite obvious. Both countries were under-
going concurrent revolutions and both leaders, Lenin and Ataturk,
were engaged in consolidation of their enternal power and
feared Western involvement in their internal affairs. The first
official diplomatic undertaking of Ataturk government was Bekir
Sami Bey's mission to Moscow in 1920 to gain arms, money and
other forms of support from Lenin's government. In 19 21 a
Treaty of Friendship was concluded between Turkey and the Soviet
Union -- a treaty advantageous for both parties . The treaty
formalized the border agreements made a year earlier (Alexan-
dropol Treaty) and both parties promised to refrain from
supporting "seditious groups and activities on the ether's
territory." This last provision eased Lenin's mind concerning
any pan-Turkist or pan-Turanist movements in Russia, but it
also gave Ataturk the legal justification he wanted to suppress
22the Turkish Communists
.
When the 19 21 Treaty was concluded, both Turkey and the
Soviet Union considered themselves revisionist and anti-Entente.
However, after Lausanne, Turkey became quite satisfied with
her own peace settlement and turned to essentially a status
quo posture. The Soviets on the other hand continued to
oppose the status quo . It is difficult to say whether or not
the 1921 Treaty would have been renewed without the controversy
of Mosul, but it is a fact that the day after the League of
25

Nations decided the Mosul question in favor of Eritish mandated
Iraq, the Turkish foreign minister rushed to Paris and con-
cluded a new treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the
Soviet Union. Although the Turkish Communists had been crushed
by the iron hand of Ataturk, the Soviets willingly signed a
new treaty since it represented a means to check British domina-
tion of the Near East and aided in their attempt to avoid isola-
2 3tion in the wake of the Locarno negotiations.
After 1925 Turkish-Soviet relations started to cool. The
Soviets could not approve the stern measures taken against the
Turkish Communist, and "in 192 8-29, in the course of a general
ideological reorientation in Moscow... (Ataturk) was abruptly
transformed from a revolutionary hero to a reactionary tyrant."
The Soviets increased communist activity in Turkey and this
led to more forceful repression by the Turks. However, an
event of this time period points out the flexibility of Turkish
diplomacy and highlights the Soviet's willingness to exploit
any weakness in the West.
The New York Stock Exchange crash of 19 2 9 ushered in the
"great depression" which quickly spread economic chaos and
ruin around the world. Turkey had not yet been fully assim-
ilated into the Western capitalist free enterprise system,
and being primarily an agricultural society she was able to
feed her own people and protect them against the most devastat-
ing consequences of the depression. However, the fall in world
food prices left Turkey's new industries vulnerable due to a
dangerously unfavorable balance of trade. As Lewis explains it:
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The West had failed; it was inevitable
that many eyes should turn to another part
of the world, where a rival, totally dif-
ferent system of economic organization
was being tried. Soviet Russia with all
her difficulties, had been little affected
by the crisis of capitalism. Her state-
directed, state-operated economy seemed
immune to the depression, and even the
governments of the capitalist West...
were trying to solve the crisis by in-
creasing state intervention in economic
matters. Turkey was soon to follow -- _
,.
and surpass -- their example.
It was at this time, in early 19 31, that Ataturk published
his famous manifesto in which he set forth the six "fundamental
and unchaging principles" (Six Arrows). Of these six principles,
the only new one was etatism. It has been argued that the
Turkish policy of etatism was Soviet inspired. Spokesmen for
etatism denied any connection between them and the socialist.
However, it remains that the first Turkish five-year plan intro-
duced in 1933 "was no doubt inspired by the Russian precedent
and was most certainly helped by the Russian load and Russian
a ,r 2 6advice
.
Even during this period when Turkey had a treaty of friend-
ship and neutrality with the Russians and the Russians were
giving Turkey economic aid, the historical Turkish distrust
of the Soviets was evident. During conversations with General
Douglas MacArthur in 1934, Ataturk predicted a major war in
Europe around 1940 in which Germany would occupy ail of Europe
except Great Britain and Russia. He also saw the real victors
of the war as the Soviet Union. In his words:
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We Turks, as Russia's close neighbor,
and the nation which has fought more wars
against her than any other country , are
following closely the courses of events
there, and see the danger stripped of all
camouflage . .
.
The Bolsheviks have now
reached a point at which they constTtute
the greatest threat not only to Europe „
7
but to all Asia . (Italics mine)
History was to prove him accurate time and time again,
even to present day.
Turkish distrust of the Soviets and the trend of cooling
relations between Ankara and Moscow during the 19 30s was
symbolized by the Saadabad Pact. In the 1920s and early 1930s
relations between Turkey and Iran were strained. This estrange-
ment was the result of various factors including the Kurdish
uprisings which threatened the internal security of both
countries. Iran and Iraq had similar disputes. However, these
three countries met at Saadabad in 1937 and together with
Afghanistan conclude a pact that provided for nonaggression
,
consultation, and mutual cooperation in stamping out subversive
activities among the signatory states. For Turkey, it was also
a reaction to rising Italian aggression. It was implicitly
directed against the Kurds and Soviet infiltration of the area.
According to Lenczowski, the Saadabad Pact "was viewed with
thinly disguised hostility by Russia, who believed it to be
another type of cordon sanitaire .
"
The Ataturk era came to an end with his death on November
10, 1938, but his legacies to the Turkish nation and its people
lived on. Many of his contemporaries and writers, both past
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and present, considered Ataturk a dictator. This point can be
argued, but it remains clear that his one-party "benevolent
dictatorship" was exactly what was required by the conditions
of the time to prod the "Sick Man of Europe" from his death-bed
and start him down the road of recovery. He was successful in
transforming Turkey from a backward, traditional Middle Eastern
country into one which was Western in orientation and rapidly
modernizing. At the same time he was able to conduct a foreign
policy which protected Turkey's internal policies from the pres-
sures of the international system. Perhaps one of his greatest
legacies was the ensured continuity of his government. At a
time when the clouds of war were gathering over Europe, and
political instability would have spelled doom for Turkey, Ismet
InSnu" followed Ataturk as president of the Turkish Republic
without a break or interruption in the continuity of government.
C. THE IN&'NU ERA: 1933-1945
During this period of time (19 38-1945) which includes World
War II, Turkish foreign policy was one of neutrality. The con-
tent of that policy, with its consistencies and pragmatic shifts,
was primarily the work of one man — Ismet Inonu. As President
of Turkey and leader of the party in a one-party political
system, he controlled all the instruments of government. Just
as it was during Ataturk 's era, Turkish foreign policy ideology
was dominated by the two principles of "peace, sovereignty and
national development" and that 'the Soviet Union represented
the primary threat to Turkey's security."
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Inonu, Ataturk's lifelong friend, closest collaborator and
29former prime minister inherited a "tranquil and loyal country."
And, considering the difficult times that lay ahead during
World War II and the subsequent demand placed on Inonu by deli-
cate foreign policy maneuverings , it is well that the Turkish
domestic situation was relatively stable. That is not to say
that all was well on the homefront. Indeed, Turkey's serious
economic problems were to have a direct impact on her war-time
policies. One of these, the infamous Varlik Vergisi (capital
tax) would have a serious impact in Turkey and eventually con-
tribute to Inonll's decline.
The clouds of war gathering over Europe in 1939 forced
Turkey to reconsider her policy of non-alignment. Finally,
when Fascist Italy, whom Turkey had considered a potential
aggressor since the late 1920s, invaded Albania Turkey sought
and entered into an alliance with France and Great Britain.
A direct result of the negotiations which led to the pact with
France was the settlement of the only question left over from
Lausanne — the disposition Iskenderun ( Alexandretta) . Anxious
to conclude a treaty with Turkey, France ceded the Syrian
district of Iskenderun to Turkey. The question of Iskenderun
is still a cause for ill feelings between Syria and Turkey.
When Turkey entered into alliance agreements with France
and Great Britain, she did so in the belief that the Soviet
Union would soon follow suit. When the Soviets concluded an
agreement with Germany in August 19 39, a bare week before the
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outbreak of World War II, Turkey, as well as the other European
nations, was taken by surprise. After frantic but fruitless
negotiations with Moscow, Turkey entered a Mutual Assistance
Pact with Great Britain and France in October 1939. Under the
terms of this tripartite pact , Turkey was obligated to enter
the war only if it extended into the Mediterranean. Again,
just as in the Balkan Pact, Turkey was exempt if the hostilities
30involved conflict with the Soviet Union.
Throughout the war, even when hostilities reached into the
Mediterranean, Turkey was able to maintain her guarded neutrality
Ino'ntt was convinced that if Turkey entered the War, the Soviets
would occupy Turkey either as a member of the Axis or as a
"liberator." He was determined not to give the Soviets an
excuse to set foot on Turkish soil. Inonu foresaw the Soviet
post-war domination of Eastern Europe, and according to Weisband,
several times expressed a willingness to enter the war on the
condition that a "coordinated Turkish-Anglo-American campaign
in the 3alkans and the Crimea, designed as much to establish
a cordon sanitaire between Russia and Turkey as to defeat the
31Axis" could be agreed upon.
Economic considerations and restraints greatly influenced
32Turkish wartime foreign policy. Due to the limited capacity
and high production costs of Turkey's industry, until the time
of the war, Turkey had found it more economically feasible to
import finished products rather than to produce them domestically,
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However, import shortages due to the war created inflation.
Additionally, the wartime army (about two million men) resulted
in heavy defense expenditures , which in turn accelerated the
inflationary spiral.
Inb'nii's government introduced a series of domestic and ex-
ternal measures to combat this inflation. The external measures
were effective, but the internal measures which consisted of
various forms of repression were resented.
In January 1940 the Turkish government enacted the National
Defense Law ( Melle Korunma Kanunu ) which allowed local officials
to force peasants to work in "strategic industries,'' specific-
ally the mines, at low wages. It also forced the farmers to
sell their crops to the government at low prices . This was
designed to decrease hoarding and lower prices, but it in fact
increased hoarding and raised resentment -- resentment which
would be felt when a multi-party system was introduced in 1945.
The capital tax ( Varlik Vergisi ) levy of November 1942 was
designed to tax those who had accumulated wealth during the
war, namely businessmen and owners of large farms. The arbi-
trary character of this tax and the way it was implemented
undermined the citizen's confidence in the state and in the
party. Furthermore, as a deflationary measure the capital tax
was ineffective since the monies "which accrued as a result
(of the tax) were never removed from circulation but reentered
3 3the money market immediately."
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Turkey's external economic policies during World War II
were not based on any alliance structure , but rather on a
pragmatic policy dictated by her own needs and a desire to
get the most for what she had to offer -- mainly chromite
.
In fact, it was not until April 1944 that Turkey, in an
attempt to bring her foreign policy into closer alignment
with emerging realities, stopped shipping chromite to Germany.
Turkey at last entered the war against Germany on February
23, 1945. This declaration of war was not the result of
pressure exerted by the Allies. In fact, by this time
Russia did not want Turkey in the war since it would qualify
her for associate membership in the United Nations. Thus,
Turkey had survived the Second World War virtually unscathed.
Her wartime foreign policy remains one of history's best
34
examples of "Small State diplomacy and Great Power politics."
However, Turkey was soon to learn that all her careful maneu-
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III. ISSUES AND DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S COLD WAR POLICIES
1945-1960
The horse kicks out and the mule kicks
out; between the two the donkey dies. -
Turkish Proverb
He who eats his bread alone raises his
burden with his teeth alone. -
Turkish Proverb
World War II marked an important watershed not only in
Turkey's foreign policy, but also in her domestic policies.
It was no accident that significant changes occurred simul-
taneously in both foreign and domestic policies; for, as we
shall see there was a definite linkage between the two.
Turkey's close alignment with the Western countries in the
political and economic fields after the Second World War rep-
resented a significant reversal in her earlier policies. The
Republic of Turkey established under Kemal Ataturk ' s leadership
and guidance attempted to adopt the institutions and the values
of the West in order to expedite the process of modernization
and economic development . This policy of identification with
the West did not, however, imply a dependence on the Western
powers either militarily or economically. On the contrary, as
discussed earlier, Turkish foreign policy before the Second
World War was independent in nature and based primarily on a
series of regional pacts . She maintained friendly relations
with the Big Powers while avoiding any formal affiliation with
any one of them until 1939. Her treaties of friendship with
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the Soviet Union represented regionalism, not a desire for in-
ternational or global involvement. Turkey's reluctance to form
any economic bonds which might lead to any dependency -- real
or immagined -- was clearly a reaction to the foreign domination
of Turkey's economy in the 19th century. The memories of the
concessions given by the various Sultans to foreigners and
foreign operations in terms of extra territorial rights through
the capitulations and the Foreign Debt Administration, which
was established in Turkey after the Sultans had defaulted on
their debts to European powers, were still vivid. Why then
did Turkish foreign policy reverse itself following World War
II? The answer to this question lies in the systemic and inter-
nal pressures which became dominant during this period.
A. THE DIE IS CAST
A number of factors in the international arena were instru-
mental in Turkey's decision to establish closer ties with the
Western countries. After the Second World War, the structure
of the international system rapidly evolved from a "balance-
of-power" structure to a "bipolar" structure. Lines or fron-
tiers were being drawn between the two adversaries -- the West,
dominated by the United States; and the East, dominated by the
Soviet Union. Since there was not yet a "Third World" during
this early period of bipolarity, a policy of neutrality at
this time was not very realistic for a country like Turkey,
situated in such a geopolitically important area. This then --
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the "bipolarity" of the international system -- was probably
the most important factor in Turkey's shift from its neutral
stance to a military alignment with the West
.
The impetus for Turkey's shift to a Western alignment did
not come from the West, but rather resulted from her reaction
to Soviet pressures. As stated earlier one of the principles
of Turkish foreign policy ideology was that the Soviet Union
represented the primary threat to Turkey's sovereignty; and
accordingly Turkish leaders were careful not to antagonize
their giant neighbor. Indeed, until 1936-1939, Turkish foreign
policy decisions likely to affect the Soviet Union were taken
in consultation with the Soviets, and Turkish agreements with
countries other than the Soviet Union -- such as the Balkan
Pact of 1934- and the Tripartite Pact of 19 39 -- usually contained
provisions which exempt Turkey from hostilities involving the
Soviets. The Saadabad Pact of 1937 was a notable exception.
Nevertheless, after 1939 it became obvious to Turkey that the
Soviets were pursuing a policy designed to isolate Turkey from
the West in order to gain territorial concessions
.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 19 39 served notice to Turkey that
the Soviets had not abandoned the expansionist ambitions of
the Tzars. The German invasion of Russia in 1941 did little
to abate Turkish apprehension. In 1943 the Soviets put pressure
on the Allies to bring Turkey into the war, knowing full well
that ill armed as she was, Turkey would be occupied by Germany
and would probably have to be "liberated" by the Soviets. Yet
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by 194-4, when the defeat of Germany appeared certain, the
Soviets opposed Turkish entry into the war; possibly in
order to isolate and exclude her from participation in any
post war settlement conference
.
The question of the Turkish Straits was a topic of discus-
2
sion at both the Yalta and Potsdam Conference. At Potsdam
the Soviets had sought to obtain an Allied consensus that the
problem of the Straits was a matter between Turkey and the
Soviet Union. Great Britain objected, while the United States
agreed. Having already received a Soviet note on March 19,
1945 denouncing the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression
and another note on June 7, 1945 demanding Soviet bases on the
Straits in addition to the return of the eastern provinces of
Kars and Ardahan, Turkey felt isolated and sought to change the
3American position. Although by the end of 1946 the Allied
position had hardened in opposition to Soviet demands on Turkey,
it was not until 1947, when in reaction to communist activities
in Greece and the 3ritish announcement of their intention to
withdraw from the area, that the United States became actively
involved. The resulting Truman Doctrine forged the initial
Lj.
bonds between Turkey and the United States.
Although the aggressive behavior of the Soviets forced
Turkey towards the West, a second factor probably contributed
to Turkey's willingness to alter her position of non-alignment
and seek closer links with the West . The War had ended in a
clear victory for the Western democracies, and the future
seemed to be on their side and with their political system.
no

It was also probably significant to the Turks that the dominant
Western nation, the United States, was geographically located
a considerable distance from Turkey and had no history of
colonial domination of lesser developed countries.
B. TURKEY'S WESTERN BONDS ARE FORMED
The aid agreement of the Truman Doctrine was ratified by a
unanimous vote in the Turkish Assembly, but there was some dis-
sent over the terms Washington sought. Congress had imposed
restrictions on the use of American aid and directed the
President to terminate the program if the recipient governments
failed to meet these restrictions. And as Harris has noted:
"If there was one sensitive nerve in the Turkish body politic,
it was according privileges to foreigners. Supervision implied
control; this in turn implied abandoning sovereignty." As a
result the language of the agreement was softened while its
substance was retained, and it was signed without further dissent
Turkey soon established additional formal links with the
Western community. In 1943 Turkey became a member of the newly
established Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC) and in 1950 she joined the Council of Europe. Turkey's
participation in these purely European organizations was of
primary importance for her future economic and political rela-
tions and policies. Membership in OEEC automatically included
Turkey in the Marshall Plan which was designed to provide
American financial support for the economic recovery of Western
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Europe. Albeit temporary, the success of the Marshall Plan
was to have a significant impact on Turkey's domestic politics.
This impact will be discussed later in this chapter.
Meanwhile, Turkey's main foreign policy objective was to
be a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). When NATO officially came into being in 1949 there was
no provision for Turkish membership. Perhaps, as maintained
by Harris, Turkey's desire for membership was based on concern
that her exclusion might lead to a decrease of United States
interest and a subsequent reduction in American aid. Whatever
the reason, Turkey felt that membership in the Council of Europe,
which she was belatedly invited to join in 194-9, was a meager
consolation for being left out of NATO . In no way did Turkey
"consider the Council of Europe, which disposed neither economic
nor military resources.... an acceptable substitute for NATO."
The initial basis for Turkey's exclusion from NATO was
geography. Additionally, Great Britain opposed Turkish member-
ship in the Western alliance. The British wanted Turkey to
stay out in order to be the cornerstone of an alliance in the
Middle East. It is generally accepted that the Turkish deci-
sion to send troops to Korea gained Turkey the support neces-
sary for her eventual acceptance into NATO in 1952.
C. THE DOMESTIC SCENE
On the domestic front , a dramatic change in the Turkish
political system was occurring concurrently with her shift to
the West. Between 1945 and 1950 a multi-party system replaced
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the single-party rule of the Republican People's Party (RPP).
Turkey's post-war foreign policy goals in part affected this
change in her domestic politics which in turn had an effect
on Turkish foreign policy.
There can be little doubt that Inonii's desire for Western
support against Soviet demands strongly influenced his decision
to promote truly democratic, multi-party elections. This was
quite evident in that Inonu instructed his delegation to the
United Nations Conference in San Francisco to announce Turkey's
. . . 7 . .transition to a multi-party system. Additionally, the victory
of the "democracies" in the Second World War had re-established
their prestige after the depression of 1929 had discredited
their capitalistic system. However, the real impetus for
change was Inonii's accurate assessment of Turkey's domestic scene
The social changes and specific events which culminated in
the formation of a multi-party system in Turkey are too numerous
3
and involved for the scope of this study. Some of these factors
have already been mentioned and included resentment against the
government's austere and restrictive wartime policies-, the severe
impact of the capital tax ( Varlik Vergisi ) on entrepreneurs
9
and large land owners; activities of the Turkish communist;
and the social mobilizing influence of Atatiirk reforms.
Under the presidencies of Atatiirk and Inonu, government
policy-making had remained the almost exclusive privilege of
the Republican People's Party (RPP) which represented an urban
elite composed of former high ranking military officers and
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bureaucrats. Now, in the words of Frey, "an alternative elite
had developed ... [and] an intense, personally salient demo-
cratic conviction had spread" over a large group of Turks
.
Inonu's own account of the multi-party system indicates that
the decision to abandon his single-party rule was based on a
need to ease social unrest among all groups.
Whatever the reason for its introduction, this political
experiment offered the rural groups an opportunity to gain
political influence and it enabled the masses to participate
in public life through direct vote.
In 1950 the Democratic Party (DP) of Adnan Menderes won a
decisive victory over Inonu's RPP . Thus, asserts Rustow,
"Ismet Inonu retains the singular honor of being the world's
only statesman who voluntarily abdicated his dictatorial powers
12
so as to promote the introduction of democracy."
Turkey's new DP government was at least just as anxious
as the RPP to tie Turkey politically and economically to the
West, and particularly to the United States. Turkey's econo-
mic system under the DP was modeled along Western lines and
relied heavily on private initiative and foreign investment.
Under the DP rule, which lasted until 1960 when it was ended
by a military coup, Turkey came to rely heavily on foreign,
mainly American, economic and military assistance. Thus, her
need for foreign aid became an integral part of her foreign
as well as domestic policy.
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During the period 1947-1961 Turkey received $1,862 million
in military assistance and $1,394 million in economic assistance
13from the United States. ' As a result of this more than $3.25
billion in assistance Turkish leaders apparently became insulated
from economic reality, and consequently established Turkey's
long standing dependency on foreign assistance. After an im-
pressive economic start which lasted through 1953 the economic
situation in Turkey deteriorated rapidly. Its initial success
was mainly due to the expansion of private investment, the
boom in agricultural production as a result of price support
,
the mechanization of farming, and very favorable weather.
Despite early indications and Western warnings of serious econ-
omic problems, Menderes , encouraged by early success, continued
to pursue ambitious but uncoordinated development policies.
After 195 3, due to inadequate and haphazard planning, politic-
ally motivated programs, a shortage of capital, and inclement
weather, Turkey's economy began to deteriorate and her foreign
14trade deficit soared.
The United States continued to provide essential assistance
eventhough the Turkish government refused . to follow its econ-
omic advice. Although the United States refused to completely
bail out Turkey's ailing economy, her continued aid fostered
Turkey's sometimes exaggerated view of her political and geo-
graphical importance. Finally, when faced with bankruptcy in
1958, Menderes accepted the stabilization program imposed by
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an international consortium composed of the United States,
Germany, Great Britain and the European Payments Union and
International Monetary Fund. In return the consortium re-
scheduled Turkey's debts and provided an aid package of $359
million. As a result, "the Turks were left with the reputa-
tion of being ever recalcitrant in the economic field and
hence willing to conform to the wisdom of the world's econo-
mists only in extremis .
"
In addition to establishing Turkey's dependency on foreign
assistance and creating a less than favorable image of the
Turk's ability to manage its finances, the fiscal policies of
the DP government led to significant social changes in Turkey.
The peasant emerged "as an important actor in the political
17
arena." The increased correlation of status with power and
the rise of a new middle class based on economic activity
resulted in a concomitant decline in the status of the salaried
bureaucrats , intellectuals and military officers . "The
Democratic Party government," states Karpat , "proved danger-
1 R
ously blind to the new forces developing in society." Thus,
the stage was set for domestic conflict.
D. TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS: 1945-1960
Turkish-Soviet relations after World War II were strained
due to Soviet territorial demands on Turkey. After 1946 their
relations deteriorated proportionately to Turkey's alignment
with the West through the Truman Doctrine (1947), her membership
46

in NATO (1952), and the Baghdad Pact (1955). Her transition
to a multi-party political system based on free elections and
an economic system centered on free enterprise also reflected
Turkey's commitment to the West. All these actions resulted
in sharp and often threatening notes from the Soviets which
19
only served to move Turkey closer to her Western allies.
The Truman Doctrine of 1947 made clear the American in-
terest in protecting Turkey against Soviet encroachment and
imparted a new confidence in Turkey. Whereas earlier Turkish
leaders had been careful not to antagonize their powerful
neighbor, they now became openly hostile towards the Soviets.
This hostility was reflected in the bluntness of statements
by Turkish leaders directed toward the Soviets, and the defiant
20tone of the Turkish press .
The Truman Doctrine also brought about a shift in the focus
of Soviet foreign policy vis-a-vis Turkey. Moscow believed,
quite correctly, that American involvement in Turkey was part
of a grand design to encircle the Soviet Union. Therefore,
the focus of Soviet attention shifted from the Straits and
Soviet territorial claims to an attack against Turkey's
21American connection. The fear that Turkey might be used as
a base for a Western attack against the Soviet Union would
dictate Soviet policies toward Turkey for a long time.
Soviet policy toward Turkey remained openly hostile and
intimidating until 1953 when a culmination of several factors
47

resulted in a change. Soviet hostility had been directly re-
sponsible for Turkey's suppression of the leftist parties and
22
their organs during the 1940s. This suppression of the "left"
was supported by both the RPP and DP, and left Moscow with little
hope of seeing a friendly government in Turkey. In fact, the
DP which won the 1950 elections was if anyting more pro-West
and anti-Soviet than the RPP. Turkey's entrance into NATO in
1952 solidified her Western alignment. It was under these cir-
cumstances that the Soviets, realizing the failure of their
hardline policy, began their peace offensive in Turkey. In
May 1953, barely three months after Stalin's death, the Soviet
government renounced its territorial claims on Turkey's eastern
2 3provinces and its desire for control of the Straits.
The Soviet peace initiatives in Turkey which began in 1953
continued without visible results until 1960. The Turks re-
garded these peace moves as a new Soviet tactic designed to
separate her from the West and treated them accordingly.
Khrushchev's leap over the "northern tier" to establish intimate
relations with Egypt in 1955, and the Syrian and Iraqi crises
of 1957 and 1958 involked a fear in Turkey of being surrounded
by hostile pro-Soviet states. Furthermore, the crushing of
the Hungarian revolt in 1956 by the Red Army confirmed Turkish
• 24
suspicions that Soviet peace moves were in word only. This
attitude began to change by the late 1950s.
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Several factors combined to lead Menderes to accept Soviet
peace probes in 1960. First of all, Moscow was no longer in-
sisting on radical change in Turkish foreign policy as the
price for improved relations -- Turkey could continue to honor
her international commitments • Soviet offers of economic aid
and additional favorable economic arrangements surely must
have tempted the DP government since the $359 million extended
by the West in 195 8 was all but gone. Finally, the Cold War
had entered a period of limited detente in 19 54 and Turkey
s being left behind in the process of normalization of East-wa
25West relations. These basic changes in the international
system and Soviet policy, coupled with Turkey's need for
economic assistance led to an agreement in April 1960 for an
exchange of visits between Premiers Menderes and Krushchev.
However, because Menderes was ousted by a military coup on
May 27, 1960, Turkish-Soviet relations were to remain at a
standstill for another four years
.
It would be a mistake to examine Turkish Soviet without
briefly analyzing Turkey's relations with the Balkan countries.
During the years before the Second World War, Turkey was able
to establish friendly relations with practically all the Balkan
countries; first, by renouncing all claims to former Ottoman
lands, even those inhibited by ethnic Turks; and second, by
entering into a system of regional alliances . The Balkan Pact
of 1934- brought together the status quo states -- i.e., Greece,
Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia — to contain the expansionist
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aims of Bulgaria. The Balkan Pact was successful until World
War II when Bulgaria made some territorial gains by siding
with the Axis from 1941-1944.
After the war Rumania and Bulgaria fell into the Soviet
sphere of influence and their foreign policies were literal
extensions of Soviet policy. Bulgaria was particularly sym-
pathetic with Soviet policy toward Turkey. Apparently follow-
ing Stalin's suggestions, Bulgaria expelled some 154-,000
ethnic Turks in an apparent attempt to disrupt the incipient
9 R
economic development of Turkey.
Turkey and Greece tried to consolidate their weak positions
in the Balkans by exploiting the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict.
The result was the Balkan Defense Pact of 1954. However, when
Yugoslavia improved its relations with the Soviets and Tito
emerged as one of the leaders of the nonaligned bloc the Balkan
27
Defense Pact lapsed.
E. TURKEY'S MIDDLE EASTERN RELATIONS
The dominant factor which conditioned Turkish-Arab relations
after both World Wars was Turkey's Western orientation. This
Western orientation led Turkey to adopt political, social, cul-
tural and economic ideas from the West, and it eventually led
Turkey into NATO. Additionally, historical experiences, i.e.,
the relationship between the rulers (Ottoman Turks) and the
ruled (Arabs), surely colored the relations between Turkey
and the newly independent Arab countries .
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Since the Arab countries had very little independence before
World War II, it may be stated that Turkish-Arab relations
developed chiefly after world War II. Even the Saadabad Pact
of 1937, concerned primarily the non-Arab countries of the
Northern Tier. Turkey's only other significant dealings with
the Arab World prior to World War II concerned the questions
of Mosul and Alexandretta . As we have seen, both questions
were settled between Turkey, Britain and France, not Turkey,
Iraq and Syria. Yet, the question of Alexandretta is still
today a matter of tension between Syria and Turkey.
Since they formally began after World War II, these factors,
each having roots in Turkey's association with the West can
be identified as having significant impact on Turkish Arab
relations. First, AtatUrk's reforms created a rift between
the two Islamic peoples. The replacement of the Arabic script
by the Latin, the purge of Arabic words from the Turkish
language, the abolition of the Caliphate and the general secul-
arization of Turkey in the name of modernization (Westerniza-
tion) created profound resentment and mistrust among Arabs
.
Second, in her Middle Eastern dealings Turkey was looked upon
by the Arabs as a pawn of the West. This perception was not
all together untrue, but it would be unfair to assume that
Turkey was acting only as a Western proxy. Indeed, Turkey
had a real desire for secure southern borders. Third, the
emergence of Israel had an immediate and long lasting effect
on Turkish-Arab relations . Originally Turkey opposed the
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partition of Palestine; but, after establishment of Israel,
Turkey was the first Islamic nation to recognize her and ex-
2 8
change ambassadors. '"' Although Turkey's position in the Arab-
Israeli dispute would change somewhat in the late 1960s, her
friendly relations with Israel adversely affected Turkish-Arab
relations in the 1950s.
Turkish foreign policy objectives in the Middle East mir-
rored her pro-Western alignment. This was clearly spelled out
in a statement by then Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Koprulu
.
Following a meeting with the Secretary General of the Arab
League who apparently advised Turkey against trying to organize
a defense organization in the Middle East, Ko"prulu" stated: "We
believe that the defense of the Middle East is absolutely neces-
sary for the economic and strategic defense of Europe. Conse-
quently, after joining the Atlantic Pact, Turkey will perform
in an effective fashion her role in the Middle East and will be
29
ready to undertake the necessary common measures."
Turkey's initial efforts in 1951 to help establish a Middle
East Defense Organization (MEDO) failed, but the idea behind
it re-emerged later and ultimately resulted in the 3aghdad
Pact of 19 55. Karpat assesses Turkey's diplomatic failures
in the Middle East during the 1950s in terms of her failures
to understand the trend of development and the political objec-
tives of her Arab neighbors. He further contends that Turkish
diplomacy in the Middle East was a continuation of her policy
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during 1923-1945 "when she dealt with the problems of the
area more through France and England than with the Arabs."
Western hopes for a MEDO comprised of Turkey, Egypt, France,
Great Britain and the United States died with Egypt's flat
refusal of membership in 1951. The events surrounding MEDO
merely exacerbated relations between Turkey and her Arab
neighbors, especially Egypt. An Egyptian periodical, Rozal -
Yusuf published a cartoon which depicted Turkey's President,
Celal Bayar, as a dog licking the boots of American, French
and British representatives. Vigorous Turkish protest elicited
an "apology" in the form of a second cartoon, in which the dog
(Bayar) was now proudly erect and marching on a leash in front
31
of the three Western representatives . The Muslim Brother-
hood 's newspaper al-da'wa went ever further by labeling Turkey
31
a "second Israel" and calling for her destruction. Such was
the nature of Turkey's relations with Egypt during this period.
Despite the growing resentment of most of the Arab countries
and over the objections at home by the RPP, the Menderes govern-
ment continued to pursue Western policies in the Middle East.
Finally, in 19 5 5 the Baghdad Pact was concluded. The Pact
which included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq and Great Britain
was originally a British idea, but it later fit into the
American "containment" strategy by linking NATO and the now
defunct SEATO . Following Kassim's 1958 revolution in Iraq the
Baghdad Pact's headquarters were moved to Ankara, and when Iraq
withdrew in 19 59 the Pact was re-named CENTO.
53

The effectiveness or utility of the Baghdad Pact can cer-
tainly be questioned; however, the role it played in the aliena-
tion of Egypt and her allies from the West in general and Turkey
in particular are obvious. It probably precipitated the Arab
countries' entente with the Soviet Union. It most assuredly
cast Turkey in the image of a tool of the Western powers.
Meanwhile, Turkey's defense of the West at the Bandung Con-
ference in 195 5 further strained her relations with the Third
World. At this conference of Afro-Asian nations Turkey strongly
defended her Western Alliance (NATO) with blistering attacks
33
on non-alxgnment , socialism and communism. As a result Turkey
became isolated from the Third World -- an isolation which would
later be felt in the United Nations .
Throughout the 1950s Turkish foreign policy was clearly a
product of her Western alignment and an extension of Western
policies toward both the Soviet Union and the non-aligned nation
However, in the 1960s, due to systemic and internal changes as
well as American policy toward Cyprus , Turkey began to re-eval-
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IV. ISSUES AND DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN
THE 1960S: THE WESTERN TIES WEAKEN
An old friend is a mount for a black
day. - Turkish Proverb
Let your ear hear what comes out of
your mouth. - Turkish Proverb
The Turkish-American "love affair" which began with the
Truman Doctrine and florished in the 1950s began to cool during
the 1960s. Turks joined in the chorus of anti-American agita-
tion with shouts of the familiar "Yankee Go Home." Along with
the rise of anti-American sentiments in Turkey, a concomitant
reorientation in Turkish foreign policy emerged. The Cyprus
question stands out as being the most significant factor in
bringing about the reappraisal and diversification of Turkish
foreign policy during the 1960s. However, there were other
factors both international and domestic involved in Turkey's
policy shift.
A. THE DOMESTIC SCENE
While the 1964 Cyprus crisis is commonly regarded as the
turning point in Turkish-American relations, in reality the
process of reorientation in Turkish foreign started well before
that year. As discussed in the preceeding chapter, the economic
plight of Turkey in the late 1950s had led Menderes to consider
rapprochement with the Soviets in order to obtain economic aid.
In addition, the 1959 Bilateral Agreement between Turkey and
the United States created unrest in Turkey's intellectual com-
munity and the Republican People's Party (RPP) — the opposition
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party. This agreement which resulted from the Iraqi coup and
the Lebanese crisis of 1958 stated that the United States would
2
come to Turkey's aid in case of "direct or indirect aggression."
The opposition parties feared that the provision for American
armed assistance in case of "indirect aggression" was a commit-
ment to intervene on behalf of the Menderes government in the
event of a coup or even an electoral defeat. This view was
expressed by Bulent Ecevit, a spokesman for the RPP and a
leading member of the intelligentsia, who drew a parallel be-
tween the agreement and American intervention in Lebanon, which
was based on President Chamoun ' s invitation when he realized
3
that he could not contain the internal opposition. Neverthe-
less, the Menderes regime was ousted by a military coup on May
27, 1960.
The 1960 coup was not based on any foreign policy considera-
tion, but rather was a result of various social, economic and
internal political factors. In fact, the military junta
(National Union Committee - NUC) headed by General Gemal Gursel
emphasized in its first communique that the NUC regime would
honor Turkey's foreign policy commitments.
We address ourselves to our allies,
friends, neighbors and the entire world.
Our aim is to remain completely loyal
to the United Nation's Charter and to
the principles of human rights . The prin-
ciple of 'peace of home, peace in the
world' , set by the great Ataturk, is our
flag. We are loyal to our alliances and
undertakings. We believe in NATO and
CENTO and are loyal to them. 5
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The only foreign policy modification affected by the NUC
was an attempt to broaden the base of Turkey's foreign relations.
The foreign policy section of the NUC ' s government program em-
phasized the need to improve relations with the Arab countries,
especially the United Arab Republic and Iraq. Toward this end,
Gilrsel promised the Arabs that Turkey would support the Algerian
cause. This support of the liberation movement in Algeria sig-
nalled Turkey's desire to establish closer contacts with the
newly emerging nations.
Although the 1960 coup and the reign of the NUC did not
produce any immediate real foreign policy changes, the relatively
free political atmosphere after the coup and the new 1961 con-
stitution had a significant impact on Turkish domestic politics,
and subsequently impacted on Turkish foreign policy.
Under the presidencies of Ataturk and Inon'u, and continuing
throughout the 1950s under Menderes, Turkish foreign policy-
making had remained the almost exclusive privilege of a small
elitist group. Public criticism of government foreign policy
was generally considered unpatriotic. The very nature of the
single party politics of Ataturk and InSnu. precluded any real
opposition in the realm of foreign policy. Menderes and the
DP, however, were faced with the opposition of the RPP. While
it is evident that the RPP ' s views on foreign policy were very
similar to those implemented by the DP government, Menderes did
not consult with Inontl's party on matters of foreign policy.
Under Menderes public discussion of foreign policy, and indeed
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all other1 issues, were tightly controlled. For example, the
decision to send Turkish troops to Korea, one of if not the
most important Turkish foreign policy decision of the 1950s,
was made by a small group, consisting of President Bayar, the
Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Commanders
of the army. The opposition criticized this decision more on
the way it was made than for its content. Menderes had con-
sulted neither the opposition nor the Grand National Assembly
7(GNA) , where he enjoyed overwhelming support. However, after
the 1960 coup and the reconstruction of the constitutional
government, Turkey's foreign relations entered inter-party
discussions. There in lies perhaps the most lasting and posi-
tive achievement of the NUC
.
Turkish politics, both foreign and domestic, have been greatly
influenced by the constitutional and electoral changes introduced
by the NUC. The 1924 constitution under which Menderes operated
gave the unicameral '. parliament virtually unlimited powers
.
Furthermore, the electoral system gave the largest party a large
parliamentary majority on the basic of a slim majority -- some-
times even a minority -- of the popular vote. The new Consti-
tution -- drafted with the help of a special commission of
experts and professors, and approved by a national referendum
in July 1961 -- established a number of checks designed to pro-
vide a balance between the executive and legislative branches
of government, as well as provide a viable role for a genuine
opposition. Most notably, it made the GNA bicameral by
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introducing an upper house and it established a Constitutional
9
Court to rule on disputes concerning the constitution. The
new electoral law introduced a system of proportional represent-
ation which radically altered the political scene by allowing
small parties in far bigger parliamentary voice.
In affect, the increased importance afforded the smaller
political parties after 1961 coverted Turkey's political system
from a two-party into a multi-party system. While it was true,
and remains so today, that the RPP and the Justice Party (JP --
heir to the DP which was dissolved by the MUC in 1960) were the
only large parties, the new electoral law made it increasingly
more difficult for a single party to obtain a majority. Since
1961 only one party, Stfleyman Demirel's JP , has successfully
formed a majority government. The JP won an absolute majority
in 1965 and increased its number of GNA seats in the general
election of 1969. However, impelled partly by the inability
of the government to cope with increasing civil disorder, and
partly by the fear of a more radical army coup, Turkey's senior
military leaders initiated a "coup by memorandum" in March,
1971. The memorandum presented to the Presidential threatened
a military takeover unless a strong national government was
formed which would end the anarchy and initiate economic and
social reforms. Demirel resigned. What followed has been,





The major ideological differences between Turkey's various
political parties greatly influenced her domestic and foreign
policy during the periods of coalition rule by creating an
atmosphere within which a general consensus on policy was rarely
reached. In addition, it seems to be a characteristics of
Turkish politics that the party or parties not in power, rather
than playing the role of a "loyal opposition," attempt to bring
down the controlling party.
During the decade of rule by the Menderes government the
Turkish public was generally quisscent on matters of foreign
policy. This was due in part to the restrictive measures taken
by Menderes, such as the Press Laws of 1954 and 1956, designed
to silence criticism and limit opposition to his policies.
However, following the 1960 coup, the succeeding Turkish govern-
ments allowed more latitude for political activities and public
debate. The 1961 Constitution spelled out the "fundamental
rights" -- freedom of thought and belief, freedom of the press,
12
of publication, of association, and many others. Foreign
policy thus became a topic of open public debate
.
These basic changes in Turkey's political life after 1961
outlined above led to speculation that a new foreign policy
would soon emerge. However, as pointed out by Admad , Turkey's
foreign policy remained essentially pragmatic.
Throughout the sixties there was
an ambiguity between the foreign policy
aspirations of the vocal and articulate
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intelligentsia and the 'pragmatic' pol-
icies of the various governments. The
intelligentsia was able to inhibit the
activities of the government by constant
criticism but it was never able to force ,
_
the government to reformulate the policy.
Another factor which was to contribute indirectly to a re-
orientation of Turkey's foreign policy was the emergence for
the first time in Turkey's history of a genuine socialist movement
This socialism was "both an ideology and technique of action
designed to achieve rapid modernization through the national
14
organization of economic life." The emergence of the new
Turkish Left was marked by the publication of the weekly YOn
(1961) and the establishment in 1962 of the Turkish Worker's
Party (TWP) which was later outlawed after the 1971 coup.
The foreign policies advocated by both Yon and the TWP were
a natural extension of their socialist ideology, i.e., the belief
that a socialist movement could not be successful in Turkey so
long as she maintained her close ties with the West and allowed
a strong American presence on her soil. Thus, the socialist's
demands centered on the abrogation of Turkey's treaties with
the West and the normalization of relations with the neutral
and communist countries.
Although the new Left attracted many of its followers from
the intelligentsia, its anti-American campaign did not attract
any wide spread following until the Cyprus crisis of 1964. It
was, however, at least in part responsible for a basic policy
shift within the RPP. In what was apparently an attempt to
gain support from the lower class (both rural and industrial)
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and win back the intellectuals from the Worker's Party, Inonu's
RPP adopted a "left of center" stance on the eve of the 1965
general elections. A year later Ecevit, the RPP member most
closely associated with the new "left of center" strategy, was
made the general-secretary of the party and in 19 7 2 he became
+ 1 A 16its leader.
Another significant feature of the 1960s was the extra-
ordinary degree of radicalism espoused by Turkish youth. The
students had emerged as an important political force after the
overthrow of Menderes, in which they had played a role. Early
student radicalism was probably motivated by an exaggerated
sense of importance of their role in the 1960 coup. In the
late sixties it was undoubtedly affected by the world-wide
trend, especially by the student insurrection in France in
1968. For whatever the reasons, student activities in Turkey
assumed political significance, grew radical, and soon became
polarized between the Right and the Left. Anti-imperialism
was a common platform for both sides. But, while the students
on the Left attacked Turkey's alliance with the West, which
they believed restricted their country's freedom of action,
those on the Right were virulently anti-communist and opposed
Russian imperialism, which at that time was no longer an
obvious threat to Turkey. Frequent armed clashes occurred
and grew in intensity.
Economics continued to play an important role in Turkey's
foreign policies. The military takeover in 1960 was a reaction,
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at least in part to the mismanagement of the economy by Menderes
The NUC was well aware of the damage done by the short-sighted
and uncoordinated economic policies of the previous government.
Consequently in established a State Planning Organization and
initiated the First Five Year Development Plan in 1963 (the
original First Five Year Plan initiated by Atatiirk in the 1930s
did not get off the ground) . It emphasized the importance of
speeding up the rate of economic development . Economic planning
placed a new emphasis on Turkey's requirements for external
capital. In order to assure a steady flow of external financing
for her development plans , Turkey applied for a NATO sponsored
aid consortium. When NATO authorities refused, Turkey turned




The OECD Consortium for Turkey was established in July 1962
after strong American behind-the-scenes pressure. Turkey's
desire for such a consortium were two-fold. First, it guaran-
teed a steady supply of external capital for development.
Second, the Turks felt that a long-term commitment and combined
effort by her allies was necessary to attain the goals set forth
in the plan, and that linking their request for aid to the re-
quirements of their new plan would result in more foreign
assistance. The long-term commitment approach was later cri-
ticized by those who felt that it weakened Turkey's position
to bargain for more assistance on better terms . There were
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also those who argued that the consortium was a "step backward
as far as Turkey's foreign policy was concerned because it in-
vited a collective control over Turkey's economic policies re-
miniscent of the Ottoman Debt Administration of the past, and
19handicapped the pursuit of an independent policy."
Turkey further linked her economic and political policies
to the West through the European Economic Community (EEC).
In 1959 Turkey applied for an associate status in the EEC.
Her application was probably motivated more by political con-
siderations than economic realities. Undoubtedly Turkey's
desire to be considered "European" influenced her decision to
seek ties with the EEC, but the fact that it followed so closely
a similar request by Greece indicates that the Greek application
prompted the Turkish action; for as Mehmet Birand writing in
The World Today points out, "traditions of Turkish foreign
policy required that Greece be watched very closely so that
it would not use the political and economic weight resulting
20from a new relationship with Europe against Turkey." Finally,
in 1962, Turkey negotiated an agreement of association with
the EEC.
Turkey's association with the EEC has not been free from
controversy. Reflecting the close link between economic con-
cerns and foreign policy objectives, Turkey's association with
21the EEC further polarized Turkey's political parties. In
addition, preferences given by the EEC to former colonies and
to several Mediterranean countries including Spain and Israel,
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and the failure of the EEC to extend what Turkey considered
sufficient credits led to charges of discrimination. These
and other grievances which arose in the 1970s such as the
free movement of Turkish workers in Europe and the EEC restric-
tions on Turkish textiles would "threaten to drive a dangerous
22
wedge between Turkey and her Western allies."
B. CYPRUS IN THE 1960s
In terms of fostering a new direction for Turkish foreign
policy, the foregoing factors involved only a limited circle
of politicians and intellectuals until the Cyprus crisis of
1963-1964. The democratization of Turkish politics, with the
growth of a vocal and fragmented opposition and the emergence
of foreign policy as a political issue, created an atmosphere
in which a shift to a more independent foreign policy was not
only likely, but also considering Turkey's need for foreign
capital, very probable. However, not until the Cyprus crisis
of 1963-1964 did the emerging independent policy trend at the
top find wide popular support. Wide-spread anti-American senti-
ments emerged. But more importantly, events surrounding Cyprus
forced Turkey's leaders to recognize that their strict ad-
herence to a pro-Western alignment in a period of a changing
internatinal system had left Turkey virtually isolated in the
World community. Cyprus then was the catalyst which forced
Turkey to re-examine her foreign policy in the light of a
rapidly changing world system.
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A variety of forces combined to make the Cyprus issue one
of vital importance for both the Turkish government and the
23-Turkish people . To begin with there was a large Turkish
community on the island which the Turks felt compelled to defend
against the Greek majority. Secondly, Turkey felt that a Greek-
held Cyprus would represent a threat to the security of her
southern waterways. Finally, enosis (union with Greece), the
Greek position on the Cyprus issue, was seen by the Turks as a
move toward the re-establishment of the old Byzantine Empire.
Considering the history of conflict between Greece and Turkey,
it is not surprising that the Cyprus issue became a highly emo-
tional matter affecting national pride. Opposing enosis
,
Turkey
favored either taksim (partition of the island) or a federated
state .
In the 1950s the issue of enosis for Cyprus, which was a
British colony, began to jeopardize relations between Turkey
and Greece. Finally, in 1959 representatives from Greece,
Turkey and Great Britain reached a compromise solution. Under
the terms of this compromise Cyprus was to become an independent
republic under a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot
vice-president, elected separately by their respective communi-
ties and both having veto powers. Under the terms of the agree-
ment both enosis and taksim were specifically proscribed.
Greece, Turkey and Great Britain were designated guarantee
powers and charged with protecting the independence, territorial
integrity and security of Cyprus. Under the terms of the 1960
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Cypriot constitution, Greek and Turkish Cypriots would, on a
proportional basis, share governmental, civil service, police
and military functions. In fairness, it should be pointed out
that the Turkish Cypriot role in these functions was greater
24than their percentage of the population which was 18-20 percent.
In late 1963 President Makarios proposed constitutional
changes. His proposals, outlined in thirteen points, would
have reduced the status of the Turkish community on the island
from one of a community with equal rights to one of a minority
2 5
subject to the will of the Greek majority. These proposals
were denounced vociferously by the Turkish government and were
refused by the Turkish Cypriots who then withdrew from an active
part in the governmental process. By the end of the year the
two communities on Cyprus were at war with each other.
Turkey was drawn into the crisis. The Turkish Foreign
Minister's formal statement protesting Makarios' earlier actions
clearly illustrated the emotional and therefore the political
appeal of the Cyprus crisis. The statement ended: "A Govern-
ment that can abandon some 100,000 dear members of our race
to the arbitrary administration of foreigners will never come
9 R
to power in Turkey." Clearly, the fragile Turkish coalition
governments of the early 1960s could not dare negotiate a
compromise
.
Aware that unilateral action on her part might lead to con-
demnation, Turkey was forced to seek support for her position in
NATO where the United States had the dominant voice. Turkey
59

fully expected American support; but the series of disillu-
sionments that followed highlighted the Turks' faulty appraisal
of the extent of support the United States could or would extend.
In expecting American support Turkey had fail to take into
account the changed circumstances in which the United States
27
and her NATO allies were operating during the 1960s. True,
the United States had been instrumental in pressuring the Greeks
to accept the 1959 Cyprus accords; but, by 195M-, due to her
association with the EEC, Greece was much less dependent on
American aid, and therefore American economic leverage on
Greece had greatly diminished." Moreover, Makarios did not
always follow the dictates from Athens.
Additionally, since 1959 American security needs, interest
and general relationship with the nations involved in the Cyprus
conflict had changed in accordance with changes in the inter-
national system and technological developments . The importance
of Turkey's strategic location for American national security
interest had diminished with the thaw in the Cold War and the
advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In fact, the
short-range Jupiter missiles had been withdrawn from Turkey
in 1962. Ulman also points out that American interests were
colored by a large and well-organized Greek community in the
United States "that automatically foreclosed a strongly pro-
29Turkish position on Cyprus." His estimate of the Greek-
American influence was to be proven very valid by the 1975
7

arms embargo on Turkey. Furthermore, the restrictions Turkey
placed on the activities of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate
30
of Istanbul were widely condemned by world Christianity.
All things considered, it is not surprising that the American
and NATO position on Cyprus was one of neutrality between Greece
and Turkey
.
Thoroughly frustrated by American and NATO neutrality on
Cyprus, isolated by the non-aligned nations and faced with public
outcry at home, InSnil's government decided upon unilateral in-
tervention and informed its allies. The American response was
the now infamous Johnson letter of 1964 which warned that, should
Turkey suffer a Soviet attack as a result of her armed inter-
31
vention in Cyprus she could not expect support from NATO
.
Although the text of the Johnson letter and Inonu's reply were
not made public until 1966, the contents were partially leaked
to the press, and in the minds of many Turks confirmed what
the radical intelligentsia had been sa.ying about the Western
Alliance — namely that Turkey could not rely on its allies
unconditionally. "From that time forth," notes Harris, "all
Turkish governments would be on the defensive in regard to the
American connection, and the memories of the Johnson letter
would color popular impressions of the United States for many
3 2years to come."
With little pressure to do otherwise, Makarios rejected the




where the non-aligned countries had the monopoly of votes.
Here again Turkey was frustrated. In support of Makarios
,
33the UN voted unanimously to send a peacekeeping force to Cyprus
.
This vote and a subsequent UN vote on Cyprus in the summer of
1965 clearly demonstrated to Turkey the degree of her isolation
in the world community. The 1965 vote which limited Turkish
rights on the island was 4 7 for and 6 against with 54 abstensions.
Apart from Turkey, those voting against the resolution were Iran
and Pakistan (CENTO allies), Libya, Albania and the US, who many
felt was trying to make amends for Johnson's letter. The absten-
sion votes belonged to all the Eastern bloc countries and the
other members of NATO. The votes for the resolution, especially
those cast by the Afro-Asian countries, were a clear indication
of the extent to which Turkey's Western policies had alienated
the Third World. 3U
C. TOWARD DIVERSIFICATION
The Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 proved to be the catalyst
which accelerated a trend that had evidenced itself in the
late 1950s and early 1960s -- the Turkish government's desire
to diversify its foreign policy. The need for a re-examination
and diversification was brought about by a rapidly changing
international system and Turkey's need for foreign economic
aid. The relatively free political atmosphere and political
fractionalization created by the 1961 Constitution intensified
the need for a reappraisal of Turkish foreign policy. Before
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reviewing the manifestations of Turkey's diversification in her
foreign policy during the 1960s, it might be useful, as well as
enlightening, to examine the views and opinions in Turkey during
that time, since they undoubtedly formed the loose guidelines
for her shift from total to limited reliance on the United
States .
Due to various factors -- some of which have already been
discussed, and others which shall be discussed later -- anti-
American sentiment was growing in Turkey. However, it was
probably the Turkish leader's perception of changing interna-
tional environment and a real need for foreign aid that prompted
a definite shift in Turkish foreign policy. Detente had begun
to be thought of as an alternative to the East-West Cold War.
America and the Soviet Union were no longer the enemies they
were when Turkey joined NATO. Moscow, seeing that its hardline
approach would not produce results, and feeling threatened by
the growing power of the People's Republic of China, had become
conciliatory. In Turkey, it was felt that there was a strong
possibility that the European Community would emerge as a power
bloc; and in a world dominated by four blocs -- the United
States, the Soviet Union, China and Europe -- it was possible
that the Americans and the Soviets would collaborate . Under
these conditions Turkey's continued participation in NATO was
34
a foregone conclusion. At the same time there were strong




Hamit Batu, a high ranking member of Turkey's Foreign
Ministry, published an article in 1965 in which he agreed
that Turkey must remain in NATO but at the same time readjust
her foreign relations in conformity with changing international
conditions . Batu proposed a stronger orientation towards
Europe and although not explicitly stated, presumably away
from dependence on the United States. Such a course, he argued,
was dictated not only by Turkey's historical evolution toward
the West, but also by the fact that if Turkey remained outside
of Europe and Europe became a new power bloc, then Turkey's
international position would be considerably weakened.
Batu pointed out that culturally, religiously and econo-
mically Turkey could not be considered European, but was
rather included for geopolitical and strategic reasons. He
submitted that Turkey, by establishing prestige in the Afro-
Asian countries could become the bridge between East and West
and thereby increase her worth in Europe. Turkey, he continued
had long been alienated from the Afro-Asian bloc but must now
reverse this trend. But, declared Batu, Turkey's Afro-Asian
policy would only be a part of her greater European policy
and she must therefore remain outside the neutral bloc. She
could do this by supporting the Arabs at the UN; however,
her policy toward the Afro-Asian countries outside of the UN
must be one of "political non-intervention" to avoid the im-
35pression that she was running errands for others.
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It would appear that these loose and somewhat ill-defined
guidelines along with her search for foreign aid to meet rising
domestic demands formed the basis of Turkey's foreign shift
during the last half of the 1960s.
D. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 196 0S
Beyond the detrimental impact of the Cyprus crisis, other
problems arising from the American presence in Turkey had a
negative impact on Turkish-American relations . Compared to
their British, French and Russian colleagues, Americans in
Turkey lacked sufficient training in the Turkish culture and
language
. This coupled with their high standard of living and
what the Turks considered to be American abuse of the "status
of forces agreements" made them high profile targets for Turkey's
radical groups . American sovereignty over military bases on
Turkish soil and the alleged covert activities of the CIA were
also favorite targets of anti-American criticism. However, it
was not until 1964 and the Cyprus crisis that this anti-
37American sentiment gained wide-spread support.
In addition to the general areas of friction outlined above,
two specific events which were to have an impact on Turkish-
American relations took place during the 196 0s -- the Cuban
missile "deal" and NATO's adoption of the "flexible response"
strategy. Although the two events probably did not arouse the
general Turkish public, they surely created concern among
Turkey's political and military leaders.
7 5

At the risk of further alienating the Soviets and making
Turkey a prime target, the Menderes government had agreed to
the deployment of medium range atomic warhead Jupiter missiles
in Turkey. Therefore, it came as a shock and a slap in the
face when in the fall of 1962 President Kennedy made a "deal"
with Khruschev to remove the Jupiters from Turkey in exchange
for the Soviets removal of their missiles from Cuba. In point
of fact, the Jupiter missiles had been rendered obsolete even
before they became operational in July 1962. And, in 1961
the United States had begun negotiations with Turkey for their
removal. For whatever the reason Turkish military leaders wanted
to keep the missiles; and, as Harris points out, "the newly
installed civilian government in Ankara was in no position to
insist on withdrawing missiles over the opposition of the
Turkish armed forces." As a result, the missiles were still
in Turkey when the Cuban missile crisis brokeout and, pre-
sumabluy due to a time factor, a unilateral "deal" was made by
O o
Kennedy for their removal.
The removal of the Jupiters gave rise to several issues
which would deeply impact Turkish-American relations. First of
all, the suddenness with which the Cuban crisis occurred and
the limelight which Turkey shared because of missiles on her
soil brought about a basic change in Turkish attitudes. The
experience had demonstrated that a war could occur almost with-
out warning and the possession of strategic offensive weapons
makes any country a primary target. Thus states Harris, "senti-
ment in Turkey thereafter began to rise in favor of removing
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weapons systems which the Soviets considered especially dan-
gerous, in order to decrease the likelihood that the country
3 9
could be dragged into a conflict against her will." Equally
important was the impression given by Kennedy's unilateral
action that during a crisis the United States could and would
act in her own best interest without consideration of, or con-
sultation with her allies. This, coupled with the strategy of
"flexible response" and the doubt cast upon United States com-
mitment to Turkey by the Johnson letter created great concern
in Turkey.
Soviet development of thermonuclear weapons necessitated a
rethinking of the concept of "massive retaliation," whereby an a H
tack on an American ally would elicit an automatic nuclear strike
against the aggressor. The United States opted for a strategy
of "flexible response" which did not entail an automatic
140
response. In light of previous American actions surrounding
Cuban and Cyprus , this new strategy doubtedly created great
concern in Turkey. The outcome of this concern was reappraisal
by Turkey of her role in NATO.
In the aftermath of the 1367 Cyprus crisis, which this time
was handled very diplomatically by Cyprus Vance, and the adop-
tion of "flexible response" by NATO, the RPP commissioned a
special panel to review Turkey's alliance with the United States
and NATO. In a secret report submitted in the spring of 196 8,
the panel identified the following disadvantages to Turkey:
11

- The presence of United States and NATO nuclear bases
makes Turkey a target for possible Soviet nuclear attack;
- The possibility exists that Turkey may be drawn into a
war of no concern to her;
- There is doubt that NATO would operate to defend Turkey
in the event of attack;
- Turkey's freedom of action is curtailed because of com-
mitment of forces to NATO and because of United States
control over the use of military equipment provided
under aid agreements
;
- There is exacerbation of relations with the Soviet Union
and the Arab states because of participation in NATO.
The panel recommended abrogation of agreements permitting
the presence of an American intelligence network, repeal of all
special concessions to United States forces in Turkey, elimina-
tion of strike bases, denuclearization of Turkey, and develop-
ment of an independent national military force besided those
committed to NATO. The panel's recommendations were not adopted
at that time, but they were a clear indication of Turkish
attitudes and a precursor of Turkish actions during and follow-
ing the Cyprus crisis of 1974.
E. TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1960S
Follwoing the 1964 Cyprus crisis Turkey's relations with the
Soviet Union improved dramatically. This basic redirection
of Turkish-Soviet relations was undoubtedly influenced by
American actions during the Cyprus crisis. But, attempts by

Turkey to better its relations with the Communist nations were
motivated by other factors as well. Turkey's desire for Soviet
economic assistance in view of declining American economic
42
and military aid; the development of a highly vocal poli-
tical opposition; and the unprecedented anti-American sentiment
in Turkey all contributed to Turkey's rapprochement with the
Soviet Union.
As indicated earlier, there had been a movement towards
rapprochement with the Soviets as early as 1959, but the real
thaw in Turkish-Soviet relations started with the visit of
Feridum Cemal Erkin, the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, to
Moscow in late 1964. In his memoirs Erkin claims that Turkey
moved to normalize relations with the Soviet Union because the
Soviet threat to Turkey had decreased due to the NATO alliance,
the rise of China as a balancing force, her economic difficul-
ties on the domestic front, and demands for autonomy by the
4 3Soviet Union's allies in Eastern Europe. Just as important
were the signals from Moscow that the Soviets had abandoned
their harsh policy toward Turkey and that better relations
between the two countries would not be contingent on Turkey
loosening her NATO bonds. Clearly, there were a variety of
factors dictating the desirability for better relations between
Turkey and the Soviet Union, but just as clear is the fact that
Cyprus was the catalyst for rapprochement.
Early talks between Turkey and the Soviet Union seem to
have been restricted to Turkey's desire for support of her
Cyprus position and the Soviet Union's desire to loosen Turkey's
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Western ties and to pre-empt the Chinese who had seized upon
the Cyprus crisis as an opportunity to better their relations
44 ....
with Turkey. The Turks were apparently initially motivated
by these basic consideration. First, they probably felt that
signs of a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement would pressure the
United States and NATO to induce the Greeks and Greek Cypriots
to accept a solution favorable to Turkey. Second, Turkey hoped
to win positive Soviet support for her position on Cyprus.
Finally, the least they could expect was a neutral Soviet
position, thereby denying support for the Greek position. By
and large, the Turks achieved these objectives, with only minor
concessions to the Soviets in the form of weakened ties to NATO
such as their refusal to participate in the American sponsored
45
multilateral nuclear force .
What began as a tactic to secure support for her position
on Cyprus soon became a firm conviction of Turkish foreign
policy. Even the Demirel government, which derived much of
its strength from the mass of conservative Turkish peasants
,
traditionally the most anti-Soviet segment of Turkey's popula-
tion, continued the Turkish policy of rapprochement which was
L
J
begun under the In8nii government. Talks and visits between
Turkey and the Soviet Union increased after 196 5 and the dia-
logue was extended to other matters of mutual interest to the
two countries. Perhaps most significant was the increase in
• • 46trade and the beginning of a Soviet aid program for Turkey.
Turkish exports to the Soviet bloc rose by 13 2 percent between
80

1964 and 1967; imports from the Soviet bloc rose by 116 percent.
This represented an increase of the Soviet bloc's share of
Turkey's total trade from 7 percent in 1964 to 13 percent in
471967.
If Ankara had any apprehensions that its changing relations
with the Soviet Union could jeopardize its position in NATO,
they must have been dispelled by the Harmel Report entitled
"The Future Tasks of the Alliance." This report, issued in
late 1967, stated that since they are "sovereign states, the
allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collec-
tive decision., [and] each ally can decide its policy in the
light of close knowledge of the problem and objectives of the
other... Each ally should play its full part in promoting an
improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries
of Eastern Europe , bearing in mind that the pursuit of detente
43
must not be allowed to split the Alliance..." Ironically,
it was the Soviet Union not the West who unwillingly placed
a damper on Turkish-Soviet relations.
A basic tenent of Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet
Union was the belief that the Kremlin had abandoned their harsh,
I militaristic policy and would accept, however grudgingly,
Turkey's membership in NATO. Therefore, the Soviets' armed
repression of the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia
in 1963 and the Brezhnev doctrine claiming the right of inter-
vention for the Soviets to uphold the socialist regime in any
country must have had more than a sobering effect in Turkey.
It was, according to Harris, "a blunt reminder that Moscow had

„49
not renounced force where its vital interest were concerned.
The most immediate reaction to the Czech crisis was the deci-
sion of the Demirel regime, in a reversal of its previous
position, to cooperate in a multilateral force to be created
in the Mediterranean under NATO auspices
.
The furor in Turkey over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
soon died out. Partly due to mounting pressure from the intel-
ligentsia and the press for closer relations with the Soviet
Union, but mostly in order to secure long-term trade agreements
and economic aid for a series of industrial projects, the
Turkish-Soviet dialogue was resumed in 1969.°
Although the Turkish-Soviet dialogue continued, two ominous
developments outside the realm of diplomatic relations caused
growing apprehension in Turkey. The first of these was the
increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and the
other was the growing ideological impact of socialist doctrines
within Turkey. These two developments were to impact on Turkey
foreign and domestic policies of the 1970s in that the former
again highlighted Turkey's strategic location, and the latter
created instability in both the political and social life of
j Turkey
.
F. TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 196 0S
Concomitant with her rapprochement with the Soviet Union,
Turkey attempted to improve and expand her relations with the
non-aligned countries, and especially those in the Middle East.
The factors influencing this shift in Turkish foreign policy
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were numerous and varied. Other than the obvious cultural,
geographic and religious factors, the idea expressed by Batu
that Turkey, for strategic political reasons, must become a
bridge between East and West and the commercial opportunities
in the new markets in the Arab countries undoubtedly influenced
Turkey's leaders. However, Turkish-Arab relations in the 1960s
were conditioned above all by the Cyprus dispute.
The nearly total lack of Third World support in the UN for
the Turkish position on Cyprus, forced Turkey to realize that
her policy toward the non-aligned nations in general and the
Middle East in particular had isolated her from the rest of
the world. As could be expected Turkey moved to break away
from this isolation. Therefore, behind Turkey's new Arab
policy was the desire to marshal support in the UN for her
Cyprus stand, as well as to indicate to the United States that
Turkish support on various issues could no longer be taken for
granted
.
Illustrative of Turkey's new independent policy in the
Middle East was the diplomatic position taken by Turkey in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. During the period following the 1964
Cyprus crisis up until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; Ankara's
position on the Middle East dispute was one of guarded neutrality
It was characterized by extreme caution designed to avoid anta-
gonizing the United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab nations
In the aftermath of the war, the new independent direction of
Turkey's foreign policy became evident in the UN. Mindful of
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the importance of the thirteen potential Arab votes in the UN,
as well as of future Communist support for her position on
Cyprus, Turkey voted for the Yugoslov resolution calling for
Israeli withdrawal from captured Arab territories. These
same considerations prompted Turkey to abstain on the Latin
American resolution calling for immediate Arab-Israeli nego-
tiations. Yet at the same time, in an apparent attempt to
balance its interests with the West
,
Turkey abstained on the
52Soviet resolution that labeled Israel an aggressor.
Another event manifesting the diversification of Turkey's
foreign policy was the creation by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan
of the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) -- an
economic and cultural agreement parallel to but separate from
the Western dominated CENTO . After the creation of RCD states
5 3Harris, "CENTO 's importance visibly receded."
Initially, Ankara displayed little enthusiasm for RCD.
"The Turks," observed The Economist
,
"stand in relation to the
r i • • • •new community LRCDJ rather like the British in Europe. For
forty years they have been westward away from Asia. The most
ardent heirs of Kemal Atatiirk have no wish to see Turkey turn,
or as they would say, turn back, towards Asia on the basis of
54-
Islam." But Pakistan's proposal for RCD was timely in that
it caught the Turks in the moment of their political isolation.
Thus, Turkey, whose credit with the non-aligned bloc had
been bankrupt in 1964, began to pursue a more independent foreign
policy in the Third World designed to alleviate the impression
created at Bandung that she was running errands for the West.

CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES
1See Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment
,
p. 3 99, and A. H.
Ulman and R. H. Dekmejian, "Changing Patterns in Turkish
Foreign Policy, 1959-1967," Orbis , Fall 1967, pp. 773-774.
2





6 February 1960, cited in Ulman, "Changing
Patterns," p. 774.
4 . . .
The economic and social conditions which led to the 1960
coup were touched upon in chapter III. Furthermore, the rep-
ressive political measures of the DP government and the attempt
to use the Army to put down opposition precipitated the coup.
For a discussion of the reasons for the coup and the period of
military rule, see Karpat , Social Change and Politics in Turkey
,
pp. 227-262, and Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution
,
1960-1961 (Brookings Insittution, 1963)
.
5Middle East Record
, 1960 , London , n.d., p. 433, as cited




Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment
,
p. 400.
7 Ibid., pp. 390-391.
p
William M. Hale, "Modern Turkish Politics: an Historical
Introduction," in Aspects of Modern Turkey
,
ed. William Hale
(London: Bowker , 197 6)
,
p~! 4~
9 For the text of the 1960 Constituion see The Middle East
Journal (Spring 1962), pp. 215-233.
For political developments during the 1960s and early
1970s see, Andrew Mango, "Turkey: The Emergence of a Modern
Problem," and Geoffrey Lewis, "Political Change in Turkey
since 1960," both in Aspects of Modern Turkey
,
pp. 9-20. For
a more indepth analysis see Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment
,
pp. 147-389.
Ellen D. Ellis, "Post-Revolutionary Polirics in Turkey,"
Current History
,
April 1962, pp. 223-224.
12 For a summary of the new terms of the 1961 Constitution
see Ibid.
, pp. 2250226 .
13Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment
,
p. 401.
14 Kemal H. Karpat, "Socialism and the Labor Party of Turkey,"
The Middle East Journal (April 1967), p. 157.
8 5

15Ulman, "Changing Patterns," p. 775.
1 6
See Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment
,
p. 190, and David
Barchard, "The Intellectual Background to Radical Protest in
Turkey in the 1960s," in Aspects of Modern Turkey
, pp. 30-31.
17
On student radicalism in Turkey see Barchard, "The in-
tellectual Background to Radical Protest in Turkey," pp. 21-38;
Joseph 3. Szyliowicz, "Students and Politics in Turkey," Middle




18Tuncer, "External Financing of the Turkish Economy,"
p. 214, and Harris, Troubled Alliance
,
pp. 100-101.
19Tuncer, External Financing of the Turkish Economy," p. 214.
20Mehmet All Birand, "Turkey and the European Community,"
The World Today , February 19 78, p. 52.
21 For the position of the various political parties on Turkey's
association with the EEC see Harris, Troubled Alliance
,
pp. 18 3-
184, and Nuri Erin, Turkey, NATO and Europe: A Deteriorating
Relationship? (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International
Affairs, 1977), pp. 9-10.
22 See Erin, Turkey, NATO and Europe
,
p. 29; Harris, Troubled
Alliance
, pp. 183-184- ; and Birand, "Turkey and the European
Community," pp. 5 3-5 6.
23Ulman, "Changing Patterns," p. 776.
24-
For the main provisions of the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee
and the 19 60 Constitution see Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine,
eds .
,
Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th
Century (New York: The Hew York Times Book Co . , 1974 )
, pp.
398-399; and Suat Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey," in
Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition
,
pp. 135-155.
25 For a discussion of the "thirteen points" and related
events, see Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey," pp. 157-
165; and Thomas Trombetas , "The Republic of Cyprus: A Federation?"
in The Cyprus Dilema: Options for Peace (Mew York: Institute
for Mediterranean Af faris , 1967), p. 12,
2 6




2 7Ulman, "Changing Patterns," pp. 776-777.
2 8
J. R. Lambert, "The EEC and the Mediterranean Area,"
The World Today, April 1965, pp. 153-165.
86

29Ulman, "Changxng Patterns," p. 777.
"Ousted Clerics Get U.S. Visas," New York Times
,
4 May 1964.
31For the text of President Johnson's letter to Prime
Minister Inonii and Inonu's reply see Ralph H. Magnus, ed.,
Documents on the Middle East (Washington; American Enterprise
Institute, 1969), pp. 127-136
.
3 2 These views were expressed in Fahir Armaoglu, "Bati
Ittifakmdan Ayrilamayiz , " ("We Cannot Leave the Western
Alliance"), Cumhuriyet
,





For a discussion of the "NATO solution" and the UN peace-
keeping force see James M. Boyd, "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping,"
International Organizations (Winter 1966), pp. 1-17; and Vali,
Bridge Across the Bosporus
,
pp. 252-254.
UN Monthly Chronicle , 3 (August-September 1965), pp. 3-10.
35 Batu's article was published in Foreign Ministry Monthly
(Ankara), March 1965 and translated and excerpted in Pulse
(Ankara), 25 August 1965.




For a discussion of the causes and the rise of anti-
American sentiment in Turkey, see Ulman, "Changing Patterns,"
pp. 781-783; Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 57-60, 125-147;




For the background on the Jupiter missiles and the impact
of their removal on Turkish-American relations, see Harris,
Troubled Alliance
,







"Massive retaliation" and "flexible resDonse" as they
apply to U.S. strategy in Europe are discussed in John M. Collins,






Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 153-165, 173-182. Also
see U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Economic Assistance
to Turkey
, September 1974.
43 Cited in Karpat , "Turkish-Soviet Relations," p. 90.

44 For a summary of PRC-Turkish relations between 1964 and
1966 see "Peiping and Mideast," Chinese Communist Affairs : A





Karpat, "Turkish-Soviet Relations," pp. 97-98.
47 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, a Supple-
ment to International Financial Statistics (Washington: Annual)
1962-1966 and 1968.
48 .Quoted in Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment
,
p. 409. Also




Harris, "The Soviet Union and Turkey," p. 53.
50 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
Karpat, "Turkish-Soviet Relations," pp. 97-93; and Harris,
"The Soviet Union and Turkey," p. 54.
52Ulman , 'Changing Patterns," pp. 783-784; and Karpat,





The Economist, 15 August 1964.

V. ISSUES AND DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN
POLICY IN THE 1970S
The flood goes but the mud remains . -
Turkish Proverb
He that falls into the sea takes hold
of a serpent to be save . - Turkish Proverb
Turkey's foreign policy in the early 1970s was described
by Turkish sources as "peaceful, constructive, multilateral,
and consistent." It was in fact a natural continuation of
her 1960s' foreign policy which, influenced by the domestic
and international factors outlined in the previous chapter,
represented a shift from her strict Western alignment in
favor of a more flexible and hopefully a more productive
foreign policy. Turkey's foreign policy continued to be based
on the principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of the Turkish Republic, and abstention from expan-
sionism or interference in internal affairs of other nations
.
In short, it followed Atatilrk's maxim of "Peace at home and
peace abroad." But, as we shall see, in the 1970s, various
factors both internal and external combined to make the
following of this maxim increasingly more difficult.
The roots of many of these desruptive factors such as
political instability, student violence and anti-American
sentiments can be traced back to the 1960s. In fact, one
factor which would greatly influence Turkish foreign policy
options in the 1970s, namely a heavy dependence on foreign
economic assistance, had its roots in the 1950s. However,
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the 1970s contributed what was perhaps the most potent and
devastating factor — the Cyprus invasion and the subsequent
American arms embargo on Turkey. This last factor intensified
Turkey's political and economic problems and gave impetus to
radical factions in Turkish society.
A. CYPRUS CRISIS OF 1974
The catalyst for change in Turkish foreign policy during
the 1970s was again Cyprus. The 1974 Cyprus crisis served
to intensify animosity between Greece and Turkey. It not only
precipitated a sharp deterioration in relations between these
two countries, but it also stretched Turkish-American relations
to a near breaking point. The background to the crisis and
the specific events that precipitated the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus are too involved and varied to permit adequate descrip-
2tion here. However, a brief examination of some of the per-
ceptions and motives of the various actors is necessary within
the context of this study.
The coup against Makarios was apparently inspired by the
Greek junta's need to find a foreign policy success abroad to
offset their domestic weakness, and was based upon a total mis-
reading of United States policy and the international situation
The colonels apparently felt that the United States, based on
her tacit approval of their regime, would condone, or at least
tolerate, the coup and restrain Turkey as she had in 1964 and
1967. But the circumstances in 1974 were different from those
that had existed in those earlier years — Turkish-American
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relations had undergone a transition, and the United States no
longer had the leverage on Turkey that she had in 1964 and 1967.
Furthermore, detente and Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet
Union had decreased the threat of Soviet intervention.
Within Turkey the situation was also quite different from
that of the earlier Cyprus crises. The earlier crises had
boosted the rising anti-Americanism and contributed to a polar-
ization of domestic politics in Turkey. In turn, these forces
contributed to increased political instability. Given the fact
that it was not possible to argue that the Greek supported
coup was an internal affair in which the guarantor powers --
Great Britain, Turkey and Greece -- had no legal right to inter-
vene, Ecevit's weak coalition government had no viable option
other than intervention.
The aftermath of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus is well-known.
By the end of the summer of 19 74, the Turkish army had occupied
about 40 percent of Cyprus. In February 1975, the United
States Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. Turkish-
American relations reached their low, when later in 1975 the
Turkish government suspended the activities at all American
bases in Turkey except those related directly to NATO. It is
important to note that the arms embargo was imposed by the
Congress but opposed by the President, the State Department
and the American military. This difference of opinion allowed
the Turks to maintain their relations with the United States,
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such as they were, and still save face. The embargo, which
was partially lifted in late 1975, was fully lifted in the
summer of 1978
.
Aside from its impact of Turkish-Greek and Turkish-American
relations, foreign reaction to the 1974 Cyprus invasion once
again created a sense of diplomatic isolation in Turkey. The
failure of her diplomatic efforts, began in the 1960s, to gain
support among Arab and non-aligned countries for her policies
in Cyprus was strikingly displayed at the 19 76 Columbo Con-
ference of non-aligned nations (as it had been at Lima in the
previous year) , while a UN General Assembly vote on a draft
resolution on Cyprus in November 1976 showed 94-1 against Turkey
3
with 27 obstentxons . Consequently, Turkey has redoubled her
efforts to expand friendly relations with not only the Eastern
Bloc countries, but also the Arab and non-aligned countries.
This new direction in foreign policy must however, be viewed




During the 1970s, a period which Frey describes as a state
of "flux and transition" in the party system, two significant
trends emerged in Turkey's electorial politics. First, the
likelihood of a coalition government was greatly increased due
to fragmentation in the party system. Secondly, this frag-
mentation has been accompanied by an increase in ideological
32

polarization. Since both of these trends directly influence
the stability of Turkey's government, and thereby the conduct
of her foreign policy, they require some examination.
The 1973 parliamentary election marked a turning point in
Turkish electorial politics. For the first time, except for
the 1961-1965 period when the autonomy of electorial politics
was undermined and the party system was constrained by close
military "supervision," a coalition government was necessitated
by the failure of the dominant party to win a clear majority.
In this election, the combined vote of the two major parties




The reasons for the increase of fragmentation in the Turkish
party system are varied. First, when the DP was disbanded by
the military in 196 a number of new parties emerged to seek the
political loyalties of the former DP voters . Although the JP
emerged as the heir apparent to the DP, the competition for the
votes of the former Democrats continued into the 1970s. For
example, in the 1973 elections, the newly formed Democratic
Party, a splinter party of the JP , managed to gain 4 5 parlia-
mentary seats by projecting the image of being the genuine heir
of the defunct DP." Another explanation of the proliferation
of political parties in Turkey is the new electorial law intro-
duced in 1961 which, as discussed earlier, changed the electorial
system from one based on a simple plurality to one of propor-
tional representation. Finally, the rise of fragmentation can
3 3

be linked to the relative free political atmosphere introduced
by the 1961 constitution. Earlier, the extreme Right and Left
. . 7
were systematically excluded from organized Turkish politics
.
When the legal restrictions were lifted in 1961, cleavages
based on ideology and religion were introduced into the party
system. In the 1965 elections for example, the extreme Right
and the extreme Left were represented successfully by the newly
formed National Action Party (NAP), a neo-Fascist party, and
the Turkish Labor Party (TLP), a Marxist party; and, in 1973
the National Salvation Party (MSP) an ultra-Islamic party, was
able to become a member of the coalition government.
Along with the rise of fragmentation in Turkey's political
party system came an increase in political polarization. One
could reasonably expect that a certain degree of pluralism in
politics would have a moderating tendency. However, perhaps
due to the extreme degree of fragmentation and the hostile,
competitive nature of Turkish politics, Turkey's political
parties became highly polarized. The main source of cleavage
centers on the pro- and anti-Communist orientations displayed
by the various parties . That is , although there are some
definite differences between the parties on the Right, they
all share a common anti-Communist view. Other than in the
parties' view of Communism, this polarization of Turkish poli-
tical life is reflected in a multiplicity of issues: economic
(socialism versus capitalism), religious (secularism versus
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an Islamic orientation) , cultural (moderate versus violent
nationalism) , and foreign policy (Western versus Eastern
versus Third World versus neutrality)
.
The net result of the increase in both party fragmentation
and political polariztion in Turkey has been a series of weak
coalition governments . With little in common other than their
shared anti-Communist view -- a view now moderated somewhat
by rapprochement with the Soviet Union and disillusionment with
the West -- the members of Turkey's various coalition governments
have found it difficult to agree on any substantive foreign
policy issues . This problem is well recognized by both Demirel
and Ecevit. In reference to Turkey's foreign policy problems
in 1977, Demirel said, "A stable government can solve them all.
But... they [foreign policy issues] are readily turned into
domestic policy issues and in coalitions the difference between
small and big parties disappears . A party with five members
can prevent you from taking a decision with a veto if those five
Q
members are needed." The desire to break away from the con-
straints of a coalition led Ecevit, who had ordered the inva-
tion of Cyprus, to resign at the height of his popularity in
September 1974. Apparently his aim was to force an early general
election which probably would have restored him to power with
a majority government. What followed, however, was a long
governmental crisis which ended when Ecevit ' s former coalition
partner, Necmettin Erbakan's MSP, joined the JP and Alparslan
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Tilrkes's NAP to form a new government in March 197 5. Speaking
in 1977, a RPP spokesman asserted, "If there had been elections
9in 1975, Cyprus would have ceased to be a problem today."
The validity of this claim is open to debate, but one thing is
certain: considering the polarization in his coalition and the
emotional appeal of the Cyprus issue to the Turks, any con-
cessions made by Demirel to solve the Cyprus question would
have amounted to political suicide.
The 1977 parliamentary election offered some hope that the
trend toward greater fragmentation in Turkey's party system has
been reversed. The two major parties made substantial gains
at the expense of the minor parties. However, until Demirel
or Ecevit is able to solve Turkey's serious social and economic
problems, thereby lessening the appeal of the radical parties,
coalition governments with their inherent instability are likely
to continue in Turkey.
C. POLITICAL VIOLENCE
The growth of factionalism in Turkish politics occurred
against the backdrop of violent unrest in the large cities.
The current political violence in Turkey had peaceful enough
beginnings. However, what began in the late 1960s as peaceful
student demonstrations against poor social and educational
conditions was exploited by the extreme Left and soon became
an ideological movement against the Demirel Government and
Turkey's ties with the West. In 1969, as a reaction to the
extreme Left, an extreme Right para-military organization was
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established. The commandoes or "Grey Wolves" of this rightist
organization are fanatically nationalistic and linked with
Turkes's NAP. After the formation of the "Grey Wolves" says
a Turkish Interior Ministry report, "student movements entered
a new phase, turning into a bloody Left-Right-wing clash."
Both sides in the conflict are deeply divided. On the right,
the ultra-nationalistic "Grey Wolves" are challenged by the
Islamic ideology of the Akincilar
,
a youth group which supports
the MPS. On the left, a multiplicity of groups all broadly
adhering to Soviet Marxism face competition from extremely
radical Maoist groups
.
This violence which has cultural and religious as well as
political roots has escalated in recent years. According to
Ministry of the Interior figures published in The Middle East
,
the number of violent clashes rose from 159 (34 dead) in 1975
to 1,321 (215 dead) in 1977. 12 In the first half of 1978 the
number killed in violent clashes had already surpassed the 1977
13total. More important, the clashes have inspired violence
outside of the Left versus Right arena. In April 1973 riots
in the southeastern town of Malatya turned into an armed con-
14frontation between the Sunni and Shia sects.
The increase in political violence and terrorism in Turkey
has led to speculation that the military might as it did in
1971, once again step in to restore order. This, according to
many qualified observers, is the aim of the rightwing extremist
The Leftist on the other hand, are viewed as employing acts of
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terrorism and anarchy to bring about a Marxist revolution.
Whatever the reasons for this increase in political terrorism,
the government must find a way to deal with it. The social
and political instability generated by political violence
seriously damages Turkey's world image at a time when Turkey
is in great need of economic and political support. Addition-
ally, a shift in balance to either side of the political
spectrum could in turn affect the future directions of Turkey's
foreign policy.
D. THE ARMY'S ROLE
Since the 1960 coup and the subsequent politicization of
the armed forces, Turkey's army has played an important role
in Turkish politics. After 1960 there was no doubt that the
army, which sees itself as the guardian of the Turkish Republic
and the instrument of AtatQrk's social reforms, was the real
power behind the government. Therefore, following the coup,
the previously ceremonial position of president in Turkey Took
on an added importance as the President became the mediator
between the army and the political parties . The extent of the
army's power was evident in 19 71 when their "coup by memorandum"
forced Demirel's resignation -- a coup deemed necessary because
of political violence, social unrest and economic difficulties.
But two events in 1973 appreciably affected the power and
prestige of the army.
The first was the presidential election in 1973. In the




this occasion the politicians reacted vigorously. In the
process, the four main parties (the JP, the RPP, the Reliance
Party and the new Democratic Party) united -- in itself a
remarkable feat -- and the army's nominee, General Gurter,
Chief of Staff, was rejected. Eventually, a compromise candi-
date, Admiral Korutifrk was elected. This civilian challenge
of the military was a novelty in Turkey and, although it ended
in a compromise, was a clear political defeat for the army.
The second incident followed the first by only four months:
the Supreme Military Council announced the retirement or
"relocation" of 35 generals, many of whom were known for their
interventionist" views. The most important of these was
General Batur, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. His depar-
ture meant that all four commanders who had issued the memo-
randum of 12 March 1971 had gone. This move was generally in-
terpreted as a sign that the army was being effectively "de-
politicised," a view which seemed to be sustained in October
1973 when the army made no attempt to interfere in the general
elections.
The 1973 incidents should not, however, be interpreted as
a change in the army's role as the guardian of the constitution
and the champion of Ataturk's reforms. It is still the power
behind whichever government is in power. Although now reluctant
to intervene in the democratic process without giving the
politicians every chance to make good, the army will step in
to prevent a radical shift to either the right or the left.
3 9

This position was made clear by the Chief of Staff, General
Sancar's public message during Demirel's attempt to form a
government in July 1977. In the message which was a warning
to the politicians as well as a caution to members of the
military, he said:
The Turkish Armed Forces consider it
useful for everybody to know that they
are closely following -- with the authority
granted them by the law -- all the work being
conducted to form a republican government
since the beginning. The Turkish Armed
Forces are proud and honored to inform the
noble Turkish nation that they are deter-
mined to maintain their exemplary stand
toward protecting our democracy... We
consider it useful to announce to the noble
Turkish nation that the Turkish Armed
Forces -- which are the sole guarantor of
the Turkish Republic and our democracy --
will never favor adventurists and will
always oppose illegal activities .. .Turkish
Armed Forces, whose duty is to defend the




By virtue of its role in the political life of Turkey, the
Turkish army's foreign policy orientation takes on an added
significance. Prior to the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the American
arms embargo, there was no question that the Turkish Armed
Forces held very pro-NATO and American sentiments. But, in
an army whose capabilities have been reduced by an estimated
19
50 percent because of the American restrictions, one would
probably be hard pressed to find any strong pro-American
sentiment. However, while her politicians can talk of non-
alignment and neutrality, Turkey's military leaders realize
that her strategic location leaves her no options except NATO
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or the Soviet Bloc. Therefore, all things considered, the
army will probably remain committed to NATO. This is especially
true now that the arms embargo has been lifted.
E. ECONOMICS
Economic factors played an important role in influencing
the course of Turkish policy in the 1970s and will in all
likelihood continue to do so in the coming years . In a series
of Five Year Plans, Turkey has committed herself to massive
economic modernization. At the same time, for reasons related
to her NATO alliance and her rivalry with Greece, Turkey has
been compelled to maintain a high degree of military prepared-
ness in the Eastern Mediterranean. In recent years economic
trends both within Turkey and in the international arena have
made balancing of these objectives increasingly more difficult.
Turkey's economic growth rate in the 1970s was relatively high,
averaging between 7 and 3 percent annually. But This high
rate of growth was achieved at the expense of massive imports
without any significant increase in exports , and was financed
20by heavy foreign loans . At the same time high unemployment
and inflation have become endemic to Turkey and are increasing.
The high rate of unemployment (estimated at 20 percent in 1977)
coupled with a birth rate of 2.4 percent which dumps nearly 1
million people on the labor market each year led one observer
to write: "Unemployment and the high birth rate constitute
21Turkey's biggest and potentially most explosive problem."
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Turkey's economic difficulties have been heightened and
complicated in recent years by her own policies as well as
world events. Within Turkey, the economic policies of Demirel's
government have drown sharp criticism. His critics point out
that Turkey has borrowed more money, at higher interest rates
than ever before . Some worry that he has saddled the country
with an enormous payment problem, while others accuse him of
morgaging Turkey's independence to the international bankers.
Demirel retorts that Turkey must borrow in order to grow, and
that future profits will pay off the loans . He further argues
that economic growth is the only way to satisfy rising expect-
22
ations and preserve domestic tranquility. Demirel's poli-
tical rival, the RPP, charged him with running an "election
economy" in which national interests were sacrificed for small
political gains. There is some support for this last allegation,
For example, in 19 75 Demirel's government set the cotton price
high enough to satisfy the farmers, but then was unable to sell
2 3the crop abroad because of the high price. However, it would
be unfair to blame Turkey's economic woes solely on her domes-
tic policies. Certain international events in recent years
such as the economic recession in Europe, the world-wide energy
crisis and the 1974 Cyprus crisis, along with its reprecussions
,
all adversely affected Turkey's economy and forced her to
diversify her foreign policy.
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Turkey's balance of trade and foreign currency reserve
were effected by the recession in Europe. Her trade deficit
with the EEC, her main trading partner, rose from less than
half a billion in 1973 to an estimated 1.9 billion in 1977.
At the same time remittances from Turks working in Europe,
Turkey's only self generated source of income other than exports,
24dropped off significantly. These setbacks were further com-
pounded by the world-wide energy crisis which was touched off
by the 197 3 Arab oil embargo. According to 19 7 8 estimates,
Turkey imports 15 million tons of the 17.5 million tons she
uses annually (86 percent). The cost of oil imports equals
2 5
Turkey's entire export earnings.
A dramatic rise in military defense expenditures following
the 19 74 Cyprus invasion has severely strained Turkey's economy.
The American arms embargo, the intervention in Cyprus and the
present arms race with Greece required high defense spending.
Henceforth aimed at self-sufficiency, Turkey's defense budget
rose to over $2 billion in 1975, compared with $880 million in
1974; an expenditure of 2.5 billion was reached in 1977.
This continuing high defense expenditure has competed for
scarce domestic resources.
These factors outlined above have increased Turkey's balance
of payment problems and made the need to obtain outside credits
and loans all the more pressing. In conditions reminiscent
of the Ottoman Debt days Turkey faces a $2.9 billion payments
deficit, a $4 billion trade gap and a scheduled repayment in
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1978 of $7.8 billion of short-term loans. With foreign currency
reserves of less than $1 billion and faced with a long list
of austerity measures as requirements for future loans from
the International Monetary Fund it is not surprising that
Turkey has been searching desperately to expand her foreign
27
relations to include the Soviet Union and the oil rich Arabs
.
During the 1970s, Turkish-EEC relations continued to be
strained. Most of the controversy centered around the EEC's
reappraisal of strategic and military factors and political
options in the wake of the Third World countries' raw materials
revolution. In the new economic order, Turkey no longer en-
joyed priority over Third World countries. Her failure to
gain new agricultural concessions and the restrictions imposed
on her textile exports disappointed Turkey and created dark
suspicions of the Community's attitude and motives. Coupled
with the increasing deficit in Turkey's trade balance with the
EEC, these factors led to accusations that the EEC was respon-
2 3
sible for Turkey's economic problems. Additionally, the
probability of Greek accession to the EEC led to worries in
Turkey that the unanimous voting rule in the EEC Council of
Ministers might be used by the Greeks to block pro-Turkish EEC
initiatives. Turkey's preoccupation with Greece was evidenced
by Ecevit's request to the EEC in 1978 for more trade con-
cessions to compensate for the advantages Greece would gain
2 9from joining the EEC. Considering, the state of Turkey's
economy, the projected 1995 date for Turkish accession to the
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EEC appears overly optimistic; but, Turkey's foreign policy
orientations will undoubtedly be influenced by the character
of her ties with the EEC in the coming years
.
F. THE AEGEAN SEA ISSUE
Relations between Turkey and Greece , badly deteriorated
over Cyprus, took a new and perilous turn for the worse in
1976 because of disputed claims to mineral rights in the
Aegean Sea. The controversy actually started in 197 3 when
Greek operations struck oil in important commercial quantities
Immediate claims of mineral rights based on the their con-
tinental shelf s were made by both countries . The problem
is that the Greeks, based on their Aegean islands, and the
Turks are claiming the same continental shelf. In point of
fact, Turkey's reaction in the 1974 Cyprus conflict might
have been influenced by the Aegean controversy, since a show
of weakness on Cyprus might have weakened her position in the
Aegean Sea dispute
.
In recent years, Greece has armed many of the islands --
in violation of international treaties -- and justifies this
step by asserting that Turkey may eventually make territorial
31
claims to the islands themselves. In reaction, the Turks
established an "Aegean Army" "to discourage the Greeks from
3^
attacking Turkey from their Coastal islands." *" Meanwhile,
Greece continues to assert the right to claim a twelve mile
territorial limit around her islands . Turkey has warned
repeatedly that such an act would be cause for war since it
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would take away three of Turkey's five outlets to open Aegean
33
waters and effectively turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake.
Obviously, the stakes in the Aegean are high; oil in large
amounts could signal an era of unparalled affluence for Greece
or Turkey. Thus, while the impasse over Cyprus continues to
draw headlines, in the long run issues on the Aegean Sea may
be potentially more dangerous for peace and stability in the
Eastern Mediterranean. As the Turkish Foreign Minister, Giinduz
Okcilm remarked in January 1973: "The most important question
between us and Greece is the Aegean. Turkey's national interests
in the Aegean are of economic and political nature , but they
34
are also closely concerned with our security."
G. NEW ORIENTATIONS
In the 1970s, Turkish foreign policy changed its structure
but not its foundations. While it still rests upon the prin-
ciples of identification and alliance with the West, it is
now marked by a trend which stresses the pursuit of Turkey's
national interests in her foreign relations and greater indepen-
dence in decision making. This new orientation was influenced
by psychological factors introduced in the 1960s such as the
reversal of the intimidating Soviet attitude towards Turkey,
the Cuban crisis and the subsequent removal of the Jupiter
missiles from Turkey; the American attitude towards the 1964
and 1967 Cyprus crises; the formation of the EEC; NATO's adoption
of the "flexible response" strategy; and the lack of support in
106

the UN for her Cyprus policy. These psychological factors were
exacerbated by the 1973 Middle East War and the ensuing oil
crisis; a sharp deterioration in relations between Turkey and
the United States, first on the poppy question and then on
Cyprus; the tension between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus
and Aegean problems; Turkey's differences with the EEC; and
again, lack of support in the UN for Turkey's Cyprus policy.
These significant international events paralleled domestic
developments in Turkey. Increases in communication, education
and social as well as physical mobility led to higher expecta-
tions and greater politicalization of the Turkish people. In
turn, these factors, together with the factors discussed
earlier resulted in ideological polarization and party
fragmentation. As we have seen the net result has been a
series of coalition governments. Constrained by differences
within their coalitions, Turkey's governments of the mid-1970s
proved ineffective in the field of foreign relations. Thus,
at a time when international political and economic imperatives
called for solutions to Turkey's outstanding foreign policy
problems, such as Cyprus, the Aegean and her relationship with
the EEC, Turkey did not have a government with enough political
prestige to make the compromises necessary for a lasting
settlement to these problems
.
On the other hand, the insistence on a more autonomous
Turkish foreign policy from both the Right and the Left was
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strengthened by the international events outlined above --
particularly the energy crisis which has had a devestating
effect on Turkey; and the arms embargo which brought into
question Turkey's Western defense alliance. Therefore, while
little or no progress has been made on the Cyprus and Aegean
issues, Turkey has exhibited strong moves toward developing
good political and economic relations with the non-aligned
countries, particularly those in the Middle East and the Balkans,
and the Soviet Bloc countries.
The anti-Americanism which had emerged in the late 195 0s
became virulent by 1970. So intimately was Prime Minister
Demirel identified with the United States that he no longer
had the prestige to curb the rising political violence in
Turkey. In the end, the military intervened on 12 March 1971
...
to cope with the political and social situations that Demirel
had found impossible to resolve/
One immediate consequence of the military intervention was
that Turkish foreign policy, as was the case with domestic
policy, became "above party," free from the obstructionism
of the political parties. However, the foreign policy section
of Erim's military sponsored government program did not reflect
a departure from the programs of earlier governments. Stressing
that its foundation rested firmly upon the principles of




The basis of [Turkey's] foreign policy
will be the facts outlined by Ataturk . .
.
Our relations will be expanded with such
international organizations as the UN,
the Council of Europe, and the European
Economic Community.
Regarding NATO, it said, "NATO is a defense organization
that constitutes the soundest external guarantee of our
security." The program went on to describe Turkey's close
relationship with the United States and her cautious rapproche-
ment with the Soviet Union:
. .
.We are bound to the United States by
ties of close friendship and alliance
based on mutual respect and understanding.
The fact that from time to time we view
certain problems from different points
must be regarded as a natural expression
of friendship based on a reciprocal under-
standing and frankness between our countries .
This is the proof of the soundness of this
friendship, and a requirement of the poli-
tical philosophy of the Western world, to
which both Turkey and the United States
belong. In line without traditional
policy we can see the possibility of fur-
ther development along the course of con-
fidence in our relations with our great
northern neighbor the USSR, in accordance
with neighborliness and the spirit of the
1921 Moscow agreement, and based on the
principles of independence, territorial
integrity and non-interference in each _.
other's internal affairs.
The period between 12 March 1971 and the 1973 general
elections was a period of relative calm in Turkish foreign
policy. The military sponsored governments of this period
attempted nothing controversial except the ban on poppy cul-
37tivation, and perhaps the recognition of the People's
3 Q
Republic of China (PRO. Recognition of the PRC demonstrated
the effectiveness of Erim's "above party" government, since a
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government dependent on votes in the GNA would probably have
found this decision a difficult one to take. Furthermore, the
timing of the decision, which coincided with the thaw in
Sino-American relations following Kissinger's visit to Peking,
suggest a continued linkage between Turkey's American ties and
her foreign policy. The Turkish government was quick however
to deny press speculation that there had been American influence
39
or pressure on Turkey's decision.
Whereas the recognition of the PRC did not incite much con-
troversy, the poppy ban certainly did. In response to American
pressure, which included threats of sanctions and reduction
of aid to Turkey, Ankara agreed to prohibit the cultivation
of the opium poppy after the 1972 crop. In return the United
States agreed to provide $35 million to compensate the poppy
farmers. The poppy ban was an economic disaster for the
growers, for as Harris has written, "Poppy planters earned far
more from this crop -- even selling it legally to the state --
than they could expect from other produce grown on their land;
hence to restrict or abolish the crop would be an economic
4blow to the traditional producers." Public reaction was one
of shame and dismay: most Turks believed that the government
had succumbed to United States pressure and bribery. Thus,
in Turkey as a whole, the government's poppy ban was very
unpopular and added fuel to the flames of anti-Americanism.
All the political parties promised to overturn the poppy decision
M-lif they were elected to power in the 1973 general election.
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As Ahmad writes, "The question was viewed not merely as a matter
of restoring the cultivator's right to grow opium poppies, but
of regaining Turkey's right to exercise autonomy... and restar-
ts 2ing the independence, dignxty, and prestige of Turkey."
BUlent Ecevit won the 1973 election, and from his earlier
pronouncements it was clear that his government would attempt
to exercise more independence in its foreign relations. There
was no question of Turkey abandoning her alliances such as
NATO and CENTO, but within the alliances Turkey would pursue
a policy designed to serve her natinal interests and not those
of others. That, according to Ecevit, was to be the difference
4.3between his foreign policy and that of his predecessors.
Thus, on the eve of the world wide energy crisis and the Cyprus
invasion, with all its ramifications, the stage had already
been set for new orientations in Turkish foreign policy.
The emergence of diversification in Turkey's foreign rela-
tions coincides with Ecevit ' s rise to power in the RPP. His
political philosophy, which is quite similar to that of the
European "social democrats," is most closely associated with
pursuit of national interests and independence on foreign policy
M-4decision making. Therefore, a look at the foreign policy
section of his 1978 government programs offers some useful
insights into the development of Turkish foreign policy in




The effects of the American arms embargo and what the
Turks viewed as the failure of NATO in regional conflict such
as Cyprus are readily apparent in Ecevit's program:
Turkey, who is located in one of
the most sensitive areas of the world,
cannot keep her national defense depen-
dent on the decision or indecision of
other countries
.
Turkey, who for years has been making
contributions far above her economic
resources to the joint defense system
of which she is a member, has been left
in recent years in a state where she
finds it difficulty to buy from her
allies with her own money the defense
equipment she needs.
This bitter experience has proved
the setbacks of basing our national
defense on external sources, especially
on a single source, beyond a limit.
Consequently, the government program while, keeping "in
view the importance of [Turkey's] alliance membership," gives
top priority to "the elaboration of a national security concept
in keeping with Turkey's needs and resources."
A novel feature of Ecevit's program is its emphasis on
regionalism -- an emphasis reminiscent of Ataturk's era.
Stating that the government "will make use of, as a lasting
factor, the importance of its historic and geographic location
as a Middle East, Mediterranean and Balkan country," the
program promises, "without any discrimination from the view-
point of domestic order," to:
...follow a dynamic foreign policy
which is mindful of a just balance
among the interests of nations, primarily
those of the counties of the region




.manifest constant care to prevent
[Turkey's] contribution to alliances
from being a source of anxiety and
distrust for the countries of the region.
...establish close relations, coop-
eration and solidarity with the coun-
tries of the region.
...support the countries of the region
to engage in multilateral and constant
cooperation in order to develop stronger
economies based on larger markets, to
accelerate their development and to
save them from exploitation.
Attesting to the impact of economic considerations on
foreign policy, the program points out that the strength
derived "from regional economic cooperation" will allow
Turkey to "seek ways of cooperating with technologically
advanced countries without casting a shadow on [her] in-
dependence or freedom to decide." Along this line it
promises to revise Turkey's "relations with the EEC in a
way to function in favor of our country and economy" and
gain "for the Turkish economy a structure which will not
be crushed in its relations with the Common Market and
which will strengthen Turkey's independence."
Regarding the Third World, Ecevit ' s government promises
to "oppose imperialism with all her might, no matter where
or under what guise it may continue to exist," and work "for
the foundation of a just economic order in the world."
On Turkish-Greek relations, the government program remains
steadfast on the Cyprus question, but hints at flexibility in
the Aegean. It reiterates the stand of previous governments
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on Cyprus which is based on "a bizonal, bicommunal, independent
and non-aligned State formula." Concerning the Aegean dispute,
Ecevit's program promises to "safeguard and defend national eco-
nomic rights and all sovereignty rights on Turkey's continental
shelf," but states that it will "make the necessary legal re-
4 5
adjustments in accordance with the requirements of the age."
Clearly, the foreign policy objectives outlined in Ecevit's
1978 government program -- a program which on most major issues
46parallels Demirel's 1977 program -- reflects a dramatic shift
from Turkey's earlier policies. In the 1950s and to a lesser
but still visible extent in the 1960s Turkey's security and
economic policies reflected her close alignment with the West,
especially the United States. In most cases, Turkey adhered
to her Western orientation with little regard as to its adverse
impact on her relations with countries of the region or Third
World nations. However, influenced by changes in the inter-
national system; political and economic imperatives
,
generated
by the Cyprus conflict and the energy crisis; and internal
political as well as social changes, Turkey's governments in
the 1970s began to seek more diversity and independence in their
foreign policy. Where this search will lead is a difficult
question, the answer to which will be attempted in the following
chapter. First, however, it might be useful to examine the
direction of Turkey's foreign policy by taking a brief look at
her relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and the
Middle East during the 1970s.
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H. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1970S
Undoubtedly, the' major turning point in Turkish-American
relations was the United States arms embargo which followed
Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974. However, several other
factors contributed to the deterioration of relations between
these two countries in the 1970s. The anti-Americanism which
began in 1960s continued into the 1970s. By the end of 1970,
the radical student movement had gained such momentum that it
led to the kidnapping of five American soldiers by the Revolu-
tionary Students Federation -- a highly extremist organization,
47dedicated to the expulsion of all Americans from Turkey.
It was these events that in part precipitated the ouster of
Demirel in March 1971.
The military sponsored governments which lasted until the
fall of 1973 put an effective damper on student activist and
other radicals, thereby silencing most of the criticism of the
government's pro-American activities. However, as we have seen,
the government ban on poppy growing and the illusion it gave
of the United States dictating Turkish policy provided a rally-
ing point for the forces advocating independence in Turkey's
decision making. On the other hand, the Turkish decision in
19 74 to resume poppy cultivation provided ammunition to those
members in the United States Congress who favored cutting for-
eign aid, and it probably influenced the arms embargo decision.
Another factor which contributed toward the loosening of




amount of American aid to Turkey after 1968. The phasing
down of American aid to Turkey was based on two considerations.
First of all, there was growing reluctance in Washington to
continue large aid programs at a time when the United States
itself was experiencing an unfavorable trend in its balance of
trade. On the other hand, Turkey's economic position improved
greatly in the decade following 1964. From a state of per-
ennial deficit in its foreign reserve account, Turkey developed
to a point of having large annual surpluses of foreign exchange.
Therefore, the effect of reduced American aid on the Turkish
economy was very small. Indeed, by 1974 "the accretion of
sizeable reserves" states Harris, "freed Turkey from dependence
49
on concessionary assistance from abroad."
The only immediate effect of the decrease in American aid
in the late 1960s was that it probably added fuel to the nation-
alist movement in Turkey. For a long time the nationalists had
argued that the Americans benefited more from the alliance
than did the Turks. However, after the price of oil sky-
rockedted in 1974 and the Turks began to feel the effects of
the European recession in the form of decreased remittances
from workers in Europe, the decrease in United States aid --
especially after the arms embargo -- was felt very strongly
in Turkey
.
The Turkish-American estrangement following the Cyprus crisis
of 1974 took place within the context of growing Turkish nation-
alism, decreasing American aid, and misunderstanding on both
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sides over the poppy question. Moreover, the increasing
divergent interests between the allies, with Turkey focusing
more and more on regional concerns and rapprochement with the
Soviet Union, all served to modify the relationship even
before the arms embargo.
The impact on Turkey of the arms embargo which was finally
lifted in the summer of 1978 was probably more psychological
and political than it was economic. For, even though the Turks
are ready to single out the embargo, the roots of their economic
problems go far beyond the embargo -- ranging from international
economic factors such as the European recession and the energy
crisis, to questionalbe economic policies of Turkey's various
governments, to the arms race with Greece. Psychologically the
embargo destroyed Turkey's faith in the United States as a
reliable ally. Politically, it strengthened the radical groups
in Turkey and added to her political and social problems at
home .
The repercussions of the arms embargo imposed on Ankara by
the United Srates Congress under pressure from the Greek lobby
in February 197 5 were immediate. In July 1975, under pressure
from both left and right, Premier Demirel, in the past one of
Turkey's most pro-American politicians, stopped operational
activities at 26 American bases in Turkey. The partial lift-
ing of the arms embargo in September 1975 was followed in
March 1976 by the announcement of a new Turkish-American Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA), under which Turkey would receive
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$1 billion in military aid over four years and the 26 American
bases in Turkey would be reopened under nominal Turkish control.
However, pending a settlement in Cyprus, both President Ford
and President Carter were hesitant to present the DCA to
Congress for ratification. By April 1978 it still had not been
ratified and as House Foreign Relations Committee member Stephen
Solarz told a press conference in Ankara, the DCA had become
52
a "museum piece."
After the 1974 Cyprus crisis, economic and psychological
imperatives forced a rethinking of Turkey's role in NATO.
Although there has been no move by Turkey to withdraw from
NATO, both Ecevit and Demirel have suggested an adjustment of
Turkey's NATO role. The current thinking is that Turkey
should reduce her role in NATO to a level commensurate with
5 3
the political and economic support she receives from NATO.
Due to the timing of Turkish statements concerning her role
in NATO, they were generally considered bluffs to influence
the American Congress's vote on the arms embargo. But recent
actions and statements by Ecevit indicate a real shift in
Turkey's defense posture. Already in 1978, he has:
--Rejected NATO's new, long-term defense program arguing
that it does not conform to spirit of East-West detente.
Additionally, it would have put an additional $5 billion
burden on Turkey's budget for the next five year.
--Revealed a change in Turkey's concept of the external
threat. He dismissed the idea that Turkey is threatened by the
Soviet Union, which has 15 divisions on the Turkish border.
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He has spoken instead of "genuine danger" from other quarters
-- presumably Greece -- and announced a redeployment of Turkey's
forces to meet "present circumstances."
--Suggested that Turkey reduce the size of her armed forces
(currently approximately 450,000 strong and second largest in
NATO) by at least one-third and put part of Turkey's forces
strictly under Turkish command.
--Announced the development of a new "national" defense
program which would continue whether the arms embargo was
lifted or not. This new program would take into account
Turkey's real defense needs," according to her national
interests, and not just NATO's thinking and programs, as
51+has been the case in the past .
"
Moreover, to counteract any future pressure exerted through
an arms embargo, as well as to ease her defense burden, Turkey
5 5has stepped up efforts to establish a local defense industry.
The lifting of the arms embargo by the United States Congress
in the summer of 1978 opened the way for an improvement in
Turkish-American relations . A week after the embargo was
lifted the Turkish government decided to allow the reopening
of four American bases in Turkey under a provisional status,
pending the finalization of a new defense agreement between
the two countries.
The future of the other 22 American bases which were de-
activiated in 1975 is uncertain. On the one hand, Ecevit is
known to be quite sensitive on the question of detente and
would probably consider the reopening of the installation
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designed to monitor Soviet missile activities as a move con-
tributing to the SALT agreement. On the other hand, Turkey
is actively purusing a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet
Union, and therefore, Ecevit would probably like the other
American bases (except the NATO base at Incirlik) to be
a- 4-1 A 57dismantled
.
In light of detente and Turkey's reassessment of the
external threat, the future of Turkish-American relations
— at least until a new external threat is perceived -- will
be dictated by economic factors. Premier Ecevit made this
perfectly clear in August 1973 when he blamed the United
States, "some European allies," and the international banks
for Turkey's financial crisis. He said the support given to
Turkey by its Western allies would be the "principle factor
c o
shaping the nature of our future relations with them."
I. TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS
The deterioration of Turkish-American relations in the
1970s is all the more significant because it coincided with,
and to some extent reinforced, Turkey's rapprochement with
the Soviet Union. This rapprochement culminated in the signing
of a Turkish-Soviet document on "principles of goodneighborly
and friendly cooperation" in June 1978 -- the first such
document to be signed between these two countries since Moscow
denounced the 1925 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression in
591945. While this joint agreement on friendship and coopera-
tion falls considerably short of Moscow's maximum objective --
the signing of a non-aggression pact — it nonetheless is
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indicative of the degree to which Turkish-Soviet relations
have improved over the last few years, and it underscores the
Soviet's willingness to exploit any trends which might further
loosen Turkey's ties to the United States and NATO.
Although it is true that Turkey's efforts to improve her
relations with the Soviet Union intensified after she found
herself isolated following the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the framework
of the 1978 agreement is contained in the "Declaration of
Principles of Good Neighbor Relations" issued during Soviet
r n
President Podgorni's visit to Turkey in 1972. The declaration
covered all the sensitive points of contention between the two
states to include:
1) Development of relations between the two countries
in conformity with traditions of peace , friendship and good
neighborhood as established by Kemal Atatiirk and V. I. Lenin.
2) Respect for the sovereignty and equality of nations.
3) Respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability
of the borders of the states.
4) Non-interferences in the domestic affairs of states.
5) Respect for the inalienable right of every state to
choose and develop its own political, economic, social and
cultural system.
6) Non-recourse to force or to the threat of force, refusal
to permit authorization for aggression and for other subversive
activities to other states
.
7) Respect for the obligations springing from treaties
and other sources of international law.
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8) Resolution of international disputes by peaceful means.
Thus, the political document on "friendship and cooperation"
which first saw light during the 1971-1973 era of military
backed governments and was revived by Demirel's government
during Premier Kosgin's 1975 visit ~ was eventually signed by
Ecevit in 1978.
Both the Soviets and the Turks have benefited from the les-
sening of tension between their two states. The Soviet Union
no longer faces direct confrontation on her southern border.
Its naval policy in the eastern Mediterranean cannot help but
benefit from a less hostile and less suspicious Turkey. But
more importantly, the Soviets are edging closer to their
ultimate goal of destroying, or at least severely weakening
NATO's southeastern flank. Since the late 1960s Soviet military
aircraft have been permitted to overfly Turkey on Their way to
the Middle East, including resupply missions during the 1973
Arab-Israeli War. But in January 1973, reflecting a desire tc
maintain a balance between her East and West relations,
Turkey, acting upon American and NATO intelligence reports,
cautioned the Soviets about the great increase of military
flights over her territory to Ethiopia. Reflecting their
desire to maintain friendly relations with Turkey, the Soviet
reduced the number overflights . The overflights and the un-
contested passage of the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev through
the Bosporus in July 1976 — in technical violation of the
64Montreux Convention -- were probably intended by Ankara as
122

a means to demonstrate to the West the consequences of a
Turkish withdrawal from NATO. Equally, however, they reflected
Turkey's movement towards a more flexible relationship with
the Soviet Union.
For their part, the Turks have benefited both politically
and economically from this rapprochement. In the past, the
Soviet Union was one of the strongest supporters of Archbishop
Makarios ; but now, while she continues to call for the demili-
tarization of Cyprus, Moscow recognizes the existence of the
two communities and accepts the granting of equal rights to
both. Moreover, the Soviets have expressed opposition to any
kind of Cyprus-Greece union and ended the exclusive relation-
ship they accorded to the late Greek-Cypriot leader, Makarios.
Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has exercised extreme
caution on the Cyprus issue so as to avoid any anti-Turkish
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stance .
In addition to gaining a more understanding Soviet attitude
on the Cyprus issue, Turkey has reaped enormous economic gains
from her rapprochement with the Soviets. After 1974, Moscow
stepped up its courtship of Turkey in an effort to exploit
the strains in Turkish-American relations resulting from the
Cyprus issue. Since the Soviet courtship of the Turks began
in 1953, Turkey has received more than $1.2 billion in economic
credits and grants from Moscow, including a huge $650 million
credit in 1975. In fact, in 1975 Turkey was the leading reci-
pient of Soviet foreign aid, receiving more than half of all




In conjunction with the document on "friendship and coop-
eration," two additional agreements were signed by the Turks
and the Soviets in 1978. The first was an agreement on the
continental shelf in the Black Sea. Although at the time,
Turkey was not engaged in sea bed exploration in any disputed
areas of the Black Sea, the agreement could avert trouble in
the future. Moreover, it stands out as an example to Greece
that the Aegean Sea continental shelf dispute can be solved
through direct negotiations . The other document was a three-
year economic and trade agreement providing for the export
of Soviet oil, payable by Turkish wheat and other products.
This agreement will allow Turkey to meet one fourth of its
Ft 7imported oil needs without having to pay scarce hard currency.
The signing of these agreements followed in the wake of Chinese
Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit to Ankara in June 197 3.
Hua's visit undoubtedly influenced Moscow's willingness to
R R
negotiate terms favorable to Turkey.
Turkey's contacts with the Balkan communist countries
were also more productive in the 1970s. A series of State
visits between Turkey and her communist Balkan neighbors
have, in the past few years, yielded many concrete results
R Q
in political, economic and cultural cooperation. The left-
leaning government of Premier Ecevit which came to power in
January 1978 has been very active in its attempts to build
upon and expand Turkey's contacts with her socialist neighbors
70that were initiated by the previous governments.
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In all, Turkey's new orientation toward economic coopera-
tion with the Eastern Blox has been productive and promises
to be much more- so in the future. According to a CIA report
compiled from Department of State sources, at the end of 1976
Turkey was discussing Communist participation in $2.2 billion
worth of industrial projects under a series of broad economic
agreement that assure Communist countries a growing role in
71Ankara's development plans.
J. TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST
As a result of the combination of the various internal and
external factors discussed earlier, in the 1970s, Turkey's
efforts to improve her ties with the countries of the Middle
East have gained steady momentum. As we have seen, Turkey's
initial moves to establish closer relations with the Middle
Eastern countries were motivated by a desire to break out of
the political isolation in which she found herself following
the 1960's Cyprus crises. In the 1970s, however, while inter-
national support for- her Cyprus position continued to influence
her foreign policy vis-a-vis the Third World, domestic poli-
tical factors and economic imperatives became the prime
motivators of Turkey's Middle East policies.
The rise of the National Salvation Party (NSP) , whose
ideology is ultra-Islamic, reflects the emergence in Turkey
of a nationalism based on a return to Islamic fundamentalism.
This religiously-oriented nationalism has been characterized
in Turkish foreign policy by a desire for closer ties with
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the Arab world and an increasingly skeptical attitude towards
the benefits of Turkey's ties with the West. "Paradoxically"
states Larrabee, "such calls have coincided with, and served
to reinforce, demands for a more autonomous foreign policy
72
on the left." While its support is at present confined to
a minority, the NSP has to-date been an important member of
three coalition governments, and supported by Turkey's ailing
economy it has influenced the orientation of Turkish foreign
policy. But, there were other more pragmatic reasons for
establishing closer relations with the Arab world.
Support on Cyprus and religious sentiments aside, perhaps
the most important reason for Turkey's new Middle Eastern orient-
ation has been economics. The energy cirsis, her severe shortage
of foreign capital and misunderstandings with the EEC drove
Turkey toward the Middle East in search of oil, jobs for her
workers, hard currency and, perhaps most important, markets for
Turkish consumer goods. It is no accident that the thrust of
Turkey's efforts have centered on the oil producing Arab
7 3
countries: Libya, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq.
In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey held a steady course
favoring the Arabs and refused the use of American and NATO
bases against Arab interests. Since the war she has consistently
74
voted in favor of Arab resolutions in the UN.
Although Turkey has participated in all the Islamic con-
ferences, because of Ataturk's tenet of laicism, she had
approached the Muslim conferences with reservations. But as
the meetings became more politically and economically oriented,
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"Turkey's inhibitions melted to the extent of sponsoring a
75
meeting in Istanbul." On the first day of the Seventh
Islamic Conference held in Istanbul in 1976, Turkey announced
that she would become a full member, and reinforced this move
by granting the PLO permission to open a bureau in Ankara.
In return, the Islamic nations voted for a resolution supporting
7 6Turkey's position on Cyprus. ' Since then, cooperation and
trade with the Arab nations have increased, but remain far less
that expected. It would seem, as Karpat notes, "that politics,
economic interests and religious sympathies do not mix." The
Turkish economy, with its high inflation and unemployment,
apparently remains unattractive to most Arab investors . Further-
more
,
old political obstacles such as Turkey's commitment to
secular politics, her weak but still viable Western ties and
her reluctance to completely sever diplomatic relations with
Israel remain to be surmounted.
Turkey's relations with the non-Arab countries of the Middle
East -- her CENTO allies, Iran and Pakistan -- have not come
up to expectation. This has primarily been because of domestic
political instability in all three countries, and the fact that
their differing priorities have kept them fixed to their own
planned directions, far different and far short of the vision
of their long-range common interest. However, the signing of
the Izmir Treaty at the RCD summit meeting in March 1977 holds
some hope for the future of economic and political cooperation
between these countries . This treaty established a number of
new institutions and set forth the guidelines for more concerted
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77industrial efforts. The future of RCD, as well as CENTO,
will depend a great deal upon the political and social sta-
bility of the member countries
.
Outside of the Middle East, Turkey has embarked on a new
diplomatic drive to develop ties to the Third World. Stating
that it was in keeping with Turkey's new "multilateral" foreign
policy and did not represent a threat to her role in NATO,
Turkish Foreign Minister Gunduz Okciin announced in July 1973,
Ankara's intention to seek membership in the "non-aligned
movement." Turkey's motives for this move would appear to be
obvious. First, Turkey needs political support, particularly
on Cyprus. In the past, the non-aligned countries have sided
with the Greek Cypriots. Second, the non-aligned bloc repre-
sents vast market for Turkish products. Finally, according
to Cohen, Ecevit ' s government feels that such a move will regain
for Turkey "a more independent and sovereign line in interna-
7 8tional relations."
Turkey's new direction in foreign policy of the 1970s --
a policy based on a pragmatic assessment of international and
domestic factors -- was summed up quite aptly by then Premier
Demirel. Turkey, he said, would remain faithful to its
commitments to the West. "We are following a multilateral
foreign policy," he added. "The intention is to make a suffi-
cient number of friends which will act with us on economic
matters and just causes and surround oursleves with a ring of
friendship and cooperation. When Britain, the United States
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and France are in cooperation with the Soviet Union why should
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He who would have peace in his own
house should not knock on his neigh-
bor's door. - Turkish Proverb
He who embraces much, collects little
- Turkish Proverb
The wound from a knife heals ; the
wound from a tongue never heals
.
- Turkish Proverb
A. DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
Too often, the Cyprus conflict has been singled out as the
factor which has brought about a change in the foreign policy
orientation of Turkey. As we have seen the Cyprus conflicts
of the 1960s and 1970s played an important role in Turkey's new
foreign policy orientation, but to credit Turkey's new orienta-
tion to the Cyprus factor alone would be, as Tamkoc_ points out,
"to view such a complex issue as the Cyprus conflict as if it
had occurred in a vacuum... and to belittle the capabilities
of the Turkish warrior diplomats to protect and promote the
2
vital national interests of their country." The Cyprus con-
flict, of course, did not occur in a vacuum. Turkey's new
orientation in foreign policy is the result of the pragmatic
assessment by Turkish statesmen of the changing domestic and
international environment in which they found themselves at
the time. At the same time, their pragmatism was tempered





1 . The Changing Domestic Scene
In the period following the establishment of the Turkish
Republic in 1923 up until 1950 the Turkish domestic scene was
characterized by rapid political, social and cultural change.
During this period Turkey was transformed from a backward,
traditional Middle Eastern country into a Western oriented,
rapidly modernizing nation. Foreign policy was the exclusive
domain of a small group of elites embodied in the RPP . Public
interest, if indeed there was any, played no role in foreign
affairs
.
The 1950s was a period of rapid economic growth, charac-
terized by the emergence of an alternate political elite. The
rise of a new middle class based on economic activity and the
introduction of a multi-party system gave the private entre-
preneur and the rural groups an opportunity to gain political
influence. "The multi-party system, the press, the universities
and the intellectuals," states Eren, "emerged as contentious
3participants in the formulation of foreign policy." The 1950s
were also characterized by a growing dependence on foreign
aid -- a dependence largely dictated by local political pres-
sures that had to be heeded once free elections were allowed.
The 1960s witnessed important political and social
changes' in Turkey. The democrarization and liberalization
introduced by the 1961 Constitution and the changes introduced
into Turkey's electoral system succeeded in injecting domestic
concerns into foreign af faris . Rapid developments in communication
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and increased social and physical mobility forced changes in
the traditional character of Turkish society -- changes that
were bound to affect the country's national and international
politics. These political and social changes created contitions
which intensified conflict and let to the emergence of a multi-
polar polity. The new atmosphere of freedom facilitated the
introduction and dissemination of ideologies that possessed
a considerable attraction for those groups in the society with
problems of development, equality and justice. For the first
time in history a genuine socialist movement emerged in Turkey.
All these changes broke the national consensus on foreign policy
The injection of domestic concerns into foreign affairs and
public questioning of the conduct of foreign affairs, both
previously considered dangerous and even traitorous to national
interests, became generally accepted.
The domestic scene of the 1970s has been a continuation
of events initiated by the liberal atmosphere following the
1961 Constitution. Fractionalization and polarization in
Turkey's political system have produced one political crisis
after another. Student unrest, political violence and anti-
American sentiment is now common place in Turkey. Inflation,
unemployment and a high birth rate all compound Turkey's
severe economic problems . Radical groups from both the Left
and the Right are demanding a more autonomous Turkish foreign
policy
.
In a period of less than two decades, beginning in the
1950s, Turkish foreign policy has evolved from an exclusive
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privilege of a small elite group, who neither wanted nor
tolerated public opinion, to a subject of unending debate
among the various political parties who activily seek public
opinion. So radical has been the change says Eren, "that
public interest in foreign policy is now solicited as an
4-
expression of patriotism."
Public interest and concern in Turkish foreign affairs
was clearly demonstrated in a poll conducted by the Turkish
daily newspaper Milliyet prior to the October 1975 senatorial
elections. Responding to a list of fifteen problems of
national importance, the majority of those who participated
gave priority to the four issues related to Turkish foreign
affairs: foreign trade, membership in the EEC, foreign invest-
ment, and problems of Turkish workers abroad. Yet, by 1977,
reflecting a shift in priorities, a poll conducted by Ecevit
prior to the general elections of thai year revealed that
domestic issues, especially economic ones and security of life,
were the main issues in the campaign. Referring to the American
embargo Ecevit said; "At the moment there are more vital and
urgent questions concerning the Turkish public." Regardless
of the emphasis of public interest on foreign versus domestic
affairs, the focus in both these polls remained the same --
economic issues -- and clearly illustrates, as we have seen,
the emergence of economic imperatives as the dominant factor
in Turkey's foreign policy.
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2 . The Changing International Scene
The relative calm and "balance of power" structure of
the international system following World War I and the form-
ation of the Turkish Republic allowed Ataturk to conduct a
policy of external non-involvement and internal development.
Turkish foreign policy during this time was characterized by
regionalism -- a regionalism that all but ignored the Arab
world. It was not until fascism reared its ugly head in the
19 30s that Turkish foreign affairs really began to extend
beyond her neighboring countries. It was the structure of the
international system during this period between the two World
Wars, coupled with Turkey's traditional instinct for global
balance of power and a keen sense of her delicate international
position that allowed Turkey to regain sole control of the
Turkish Straits through the Montereux Convention.
Turkey's ability to remain neutral throughout most of
World War II was due mainly to the importance afford to her
strategic position by the world powers and skillful manipula-
tion by InSnu. Her desire to remain neutral was predicated
a great deal on the perceived threat posed by the Soviets
either as a foe or an ally.
The bipolarity of the international system which evolved
after World War II, probably more than any other event in her
history, established the direction of Turkish foreign policy.
Her geographic location between the two poles of power and the
strategic significance of the Turkish Straits probably would
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not have allowed Turkey to take a neutral position even if
she had wanted to do so. As it happened, the Soviet threat
to her territorial integrity and the subsequent aid offered
by the United States locked Turkey into a pro-Western
alignment. Her political, economic and cultural commitment
to the West isolated Turkey from the Third World countries,
in most of whom she held little if any interest anyway. How-
ever, systemic changes and international events during the
1960s and 1970s were to change Turkey's perceptions not only
concerning the Third World countries , but the Soviet Bloc
as well.
Detente, the reversal of the Soviets' hostile attitude,
new defense strategies dictated by technological changes, and
the perceived (if not all together real) decline in American
interest and support of Turkey all led to a reappraisal of
Turkey strict -- almost paranoid -- Western alignment. The
significance of these changes lies in the fact that they not
only offered Turkish leaders more options , but they also added
impetus to the growing radical forces within Turkish society.
At the same time, their great voting strength in inter-
national forums such as the UN and their newly found economic
strength due to the "raw material revolution," exemplified
by the 1973 Arab oil embargo, afforded a vastly increased
importance to countries and regions that the Turks previously
had been accustomed to disregard.
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3 . The Cyprus Crisis
Mention of the Cyprus dispute was intentionally omitted
from the above summary of the domestic and international chanes
affecting Turkish foreign policy. This was done so in order
to illustrate that these external and internal factors would
have in all probability eventually led to the more flexible
independent and multilateral foreign policy we see emerging
in Turkey today. Nevertheless, the Cyprus disputes did occur
and the issues arising from these dispures did have a great
impact of Turkish foreign policy.
The Cyprus dispute, which touched upon a deep psycho-
logical cord in the personality of the modern Turk, acted as
a catalyst for change in Turkish foreign policy by consolidating
and intensifying the current issues and trends in both the
domestic and international arenas. The careless and sometimes
irresponsible reaction by the United States and NATO to events
surrounding Cyprus touched off a new form of nationalism in
Turkey and turned its wrath against the West. The Soviets
have been quite willing to exploit this weakness in Turkey's
Western alignment. Time and again the Cyprus dispute illus-
trated to Turkey the degree of isolation her strict Western
orientation had brought to her. The cost of her Cyprus opera-
tions, the resulting arms race with Greece and the American
arms embargo all aggravated Turkey's economic condition
which had already begun to feel the effects of the European
recession and rising oil prices.
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All together, events in recent years have imposed an
identity crisis upon the Turkish people. Westernization has
not been easy for the Turks who, after all, came from Asia,
professed Islam and belonged to the traditional Middle Eastern
world. Now the Turks feel themselves left alone; not a true
member of the Middle Eastern Islamic World; not part of the
Third World; not part of the Communist Bloc; and, as they see
it, betrayed and rejected by the Western Bloc to which they
7
tried so hard to belong.
B. NEW DIRECTIONS: WHERE WILL THEY LEAD?
There is a cryptic Turkish story that tells about a young
man who consults a wise man named Hoca (pronounced Ho'ja)
about his future. "What shall I do?" asked the youth, "I am
poor and lonely." "Do not worry," replied Hoca, "Everything
will be all right." "You mean," said the young man excitedly,
"that I will become rich and famous and have lots of friends?"
"No," said Hoca, "I mean that soon you will get used to being
Q
poor and lonely."
The parellel between the young man in the story and Turkey
today is unmistakable; but, must they share the same future --
a future where getting better equates to getting "used to
being poor and lonely?" Is this where Turkey's new flexible,
multilateral foreign policy leading? Will Turkey, while
attempting to exploit ail her options and please everyone end
up by limiting her options and pleasing no one? The answer
has to be no. Turkey has inherited a very strong consciousness
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of national unity that has proven its effectiveness in times
of crisis. Since the time of Ataturk, Turkey's leaders have
time and again proven their ability to adjust her delicate
strategic position to changes in the international system.
Although presently suffering from the maladies which have
affected many Western countries, the Turkish economy possesses
great potential. However, the Turkish Republic continues to
rest on solid political foundations. The fractionalism which
has plagued her party politics appears to be on the decline,
and the possibilities of a strong majority government in the
future appear good -- much will depend upon how successful
Ecevit is in dealing with Turkey's domestic and foreign pro-
blems during his time in office.
1 . Turkey's Options
It is evident that in recent years there has been a
major rethinking of Turkey's foreign policy orientation. The
question then becomes, where will Turkey's new foreign policy
lead? Some have argued for a Third World type of neutrality
based on, if you will, alignment with the non-aligned countries
The basis for their argument seems to center on the need for
Third World support in the UN on the Cyprus question. This
argument is at best transitory; for, even if Turkey succeeded
in gaining Third World support in the UN, it would not help
her in any real emergency. Nevertheless, the idea is popular
in some circles of Turkish society and there is the possibility




Thus, while, as Bernard Lewis points out, "Turkish statesmen
are well aware that Third Worldism is an illusion," they
have made moves toward joining the non-aligned movement.
Others favor an alignment with the Islamic countries of
the Middle East. The most vocal spokesman on this line is
Erbakan, the leader of the ultra-Islamic NSP. As we have seen,
there has been a notable change in Turkey policy vis-a-vis the
Middle East, the most notable at the 1976 Islamic Conference.
Erbakan stresses Turkey's common Islamic anc cultural ties
with the Arabs. But, the more pragmatic Turkish statesmen
(and probably Erbakan also) see the more tangible benefits
of a closer relationship with the Arabs . Support for her
Cyprus position is a definite possibility, but the vast new
markets for her manufactured goods and the opportunity to
attract Arab investments are far and away the strongest argu-
ments for a flexible Turkish policy in the Middle East.
Most Turks probably realize that while an alignment
with the Third World or the Arab countries might offer some
small political and economic advantages, these countries have
little real political or military power, and that in any real
military emergency there is nothing they would or could do to
help. Considering Turkey's history and her location on the
southern border of the Soviet Union, exclusive alliance with
either of these militarily weak blocs would be unthinkable.
Therefore, Turkey's relations with the Arab countries and other
non-aligned nations will probably, if they materialize at all,
take the form of bilateral agreements with individual countries
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rather than any broad commitment to a specific bloc. These
agreements would not have to affect Turkey's Western alignment.
In fact, such moves should be encouraged by the Western countries,
since they could strengthen Turkey economically, thus easing
the financial burden the other NATO countries are faced with
in helping Turkey modernize and maintain her large army.
But what if the United States abandons Turkey, or if
the United States acts in a way (such as Congress reimposing
the arms embargo due to lack of a Cyprus settlement -- a real
possibility) that compels Turkey to abandon the United States?
Then suggest Lewis, "The Third World and Islamic alternatives
might tide the government over a domestic crisis by presenting
an acceptable illusion of solidarity to the Turkish people
and allowing them to believe that they are not entirely alone
in the world."
If reliance on America became impossible for the Turks,
another alternative might be, as suggested by Batu, a more
European foreign policy. In this event, a closer association
with the Arab World might enable Turkey to become the bridge
between Europe and the Middle East envisioned by Batu. However,
if the voice of Greece, who expects to become a full member
of the EEC in the near future, weighs too heavily in the counsels
of Europe, a neutralist policy might then gain ground in Turkey.
The option of Turkish neutralism has also been much discussed.
For many years now there has been talk of a Swedish syle
12
neutrality. The Soviet Union is known to be ready to sign a
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nonaggression pact. Turkey, however, does not have the poli-
tical stability nor the economic wealth of Sweden. The cost
of financing a modern arm to guarantee her neutrality would
be enormous and completely devestate Turkey's economy. More-
over, Sweden has Finland as a buffer between herself and the
Soviets. Turkey, on the other hand shares a common border
with the Soviets and is surrounded on the other sides by
potentially hostile countries such as Bulgaria, Greece and
Syria
.
At present, the only other viable option for Turkey
outside of the Western Bloc would seem to be the Soviet Union.
Yet there are few, if any, Turks except for the radical Leftists
who wish to be included in the Soviet Bloc. Yet, pragmatic
assessments of world conditions have already led Turkish leaders
into many kinds of accommodation with the Soviet Union. It would
be a serious omission to fail to point out that the Turkish
leaders are aware of the dangers of their increased relation-
ships with the Soviets . When a small state lives in the shadow
of a major power, there is always the possibility of aggression
or that national independence may be undermined by subversion
.
Though Soviet activities following World War II may be beyond
the memory of many young Turks, the spectacle of Soviet troops
invading Czechoslovakia in 1968 is not that far back in history.
Responsible Turkish political figures appear to have few illu-
sions about the course they are following with the Soviets.
Only time will tell, however, whether centuries of experience
with the Russians have taught the Turks how to handle the Soviets
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One additional option should be mentioned. Although
the chances are remote, baring any radical change in Turkey
such as a coup by the Leftists, that the Turks would voluntarily
align themselves with a Communist power, that power could be
PRC . Considering Turkey's historical experiences with the
Russians and the fact that the Sino-Soviet dispute would act
in favor of Turkey by balancing the Chinese against the Soviets,
this sort of arrangement, much like the one Albania had with
the PRC, is not out of the realm of possibility. An added
attraction of this arrangment would be that while the PRC
acted as a deterrent to Soviet aggression toward Turkey, the
Soviets themselves would be serving as a buffer between Turkey
and undue Chinese influence
.
Returning to more realistic possibilities, as long as
Turkey is located within the expansion zone of the Soviet Union
-- a geographic reality which cannot be changed -- , and is
incapable of meeting the Soviet expansion solely with her own
powers -- and economic and physical reality -- , she has a
vital interest, in fact, a dire necessity to participate in
a system of alliance to assure her security. Since there exists
today, nor in the foreseeable future, no power other than NATO
that is capable of meeting the Soviet threat, Turkey's continued
membership in NATO is a foregone conclusion. Consequently, the
question now becomes not whether or not to stay in NATO, but
rather how to reduce the disadvantages of NATO membership while
13
enjoying the advantages. It would seem that this is the
objective of Turkey's current multilateral foreign policy.
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2 . Future Directions
In the foreseeable future Turkey can be expected to
continue her pursuit of an independent multilateral foreign
policy while remaining a member of the Western alliance.
Turkey's new foreign policy might have, as some American
critics have argued, been influenced by a desire to bluff and
14-
. . .blackmaxl the West; but, even if this allegation is true,
events have now carried Turkey far beyond the bluffing stage.
Now that the difficult steps have been taken to establish a
new direction in their foreign policy the Turks would hardly
think of reversing it, for they see it as a beneficial develop-
ment, a boost to national pride. Moreover, although the arms
embargo has been conditionally lifted, the basic conditions
that generated the reappraisal of Turkish policy -- e.g.,
Cyprus, economic imperatives, disillusionment with the West,
political isolation -- remain basically unchanged. Admittedly,
much will depend on the party in power and the strength of its
government. Ecevit's RPP will be the one most likely to
strengthen the independent line, but Demirel's J? will, con-
sidering the changing domestic and international scenes, have
to follow suit.
What can be expected from Turkey in the future? First,
the state of the world calls for Turkey to secure the utmost
protection through a regular army maintained through outside
assistance within the framework NATO. Considering the enormous
problems presented by a change in arms supplier. Turkey will
148

continue to use American and NATO arms, but will strive to
increase the number of sources for these arms to prevent, or
at least minimize the effects of any future embargo by one
source. Cyprus clearly demonstrated the need for a military
force outside of NATO, established and maintained through
Turkey's own resources.
Turkish-American relations should improve greatly now
that the major obstacle — the arms embargo -- has been removed.
However, the estrangement over Cyprus cannot ever be fully
reconciled and future Turkish-American relations will be con-
ducted on a formal basis within the guidelines established by
NATO and future bilateral agreements
.
The future focus of Turkey's Western line will be Europe,
and probably fall upon West Germany. Efforts will be made to
reconcile Turkey's position in the EEC, but not at the expense
of Turkish industries or her search for new markets in the
Middle East.
Turkey would like to establish herself as the economic
bridge between the technologically advanced countries of Europe
and the vast oil richmarkets in the Middle East. This is the
idea behind Ecevit ' s "three ring theory" which he stated in
London in 1975 and alluded to in his foreign policy statement
1 R
in 19 78. The Europeans will probably encourage this trend
for both its economic and political advantages, but Arab resis-
tance will be much more difficult to overcome.
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In the Middle East, Turkey will redouble her efforts
to establish more economic and political bridgeheads, similar
to the ones she now enjoys with Libya and to a lesser extent
Iraq. The emphasis of her approach to the Arabs will probably
shift from shared religious and cultural values , which have
proven relatively ineffective in the past, and focus more on
political and economic realities . The outlook for increased
cooperation with Iran and Pakistan is good, but, as stated
before, much will depend upon the stability of their various
government
.
At the same time, Turkey will continue her search for
the "illusionary" Third World in hopes of finding new markets
and support in the various world forums
.
Turkey will, because she must, settle her dispute with
Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. However, while she
17
may be willing to make some territorial concessions on Cyprus,
nothing short of war is likely to change Turkey's conditions
for a bizonal, bicommunal, federal and independent Cyprus.
Most importantly, for the United States as well as
Turkey, Turkish statesmen will continue to seek rapprochement
with the Communist countries. Within the framework of NATO
and consistent with her Western alignment, Turkey will continue
to explore new avenues of economic, cultural and even limited
political cooperation with the Soviet Union. Economic and
political agreements with her Balkan neighbors will continue
to be a facet of Turkey's multilateral foreign policy. Recent
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visits by Chinese statesmen have opened the way for improved
relations with the PRC . However, Turkey will proceed care-
fully along this route to avoid any estrangement in her new
found relations with the Soviets.
In summary, Turkey expects, and should reap, many eco-
nomic and political advantages from the application of her new
foreign policy. In the conduct of this policy, Turkey will be
guided by two overriding considerations. First, the permanent
relevance of her geostrategic location, which even today retains
its historic importance, must be given priority. Secondly,
Turkey's leaders must deal with the economic imperatives of a
rapidly growing economy and the impatience of a people hungry
for higher socio - economic standards. Turkey's hope for the
future, which will be determined by the ability of her leaders
to deal effectively with economic imperatives was summed up
by Premier Ecevit in June 1978. He said:
If we can fully exploit Turkey's
location in the world and the prestige
it has gained from history and from its
ties with free democracy; if we can
exploit them responsibly, and if we
can exploit them in a way compatible
with the realities and conditions of
our times, many possibilities could ,
_
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